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Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle
Theory of Legal Theories
Jeremy K. Kessler† & David E. Pozen††
Prescriptive legal theories have a tendency to cannibalize themselves. As they
develop into schools of thought, they become not only increasingly complicated but
also increasingly compromised, by their own normative lights. Maturation breeds
adulteration. The theories work themselves impure.
This Article identifies and diagnoses this evolutionary phenomenon. We develop a stylized model to explain the life cycle of certain particularly influential legal
theories. We illustrate this life cycle through case studies of originalism, textualism,
popular constitutionalism, and cost-benefit analysis, as well as a comparison with
leading accounts of organizational and theoretical change in politics and science.
And we argue that an appreciation of the life cycle counsels a reorientation of legal
advocacy and critique. The most significant threats posed by a new legal theory do
not come from its neglect of significant first-order values—the usual focus of criticism—for those values are apt to be incorporated into the theory. Rather, the deeper
threats lie in the second- and third-order social, political, and ideological effects that
the adulterated theory’s persistence may foster down the line.
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INTRODUCTION
When originalism burst onto the scene in the 1970s and
1980s, it promised to stabilize constitutional law and rein in
judges by tying interpretation to the Framers’ “original intentions.” Critics complained that this approach slighted the Constitution’s popular character and could justify intolerable outcomes, such as racially segregated schools. Originalism
subsequently reoriented itself around “original public meaning”
and the interpretation/construction distinction—blunting some of
the earlier criticisms and broadening the theory’s appeal, but
at significant cost to its motivating principles of certainty and
constraint.1
When cost-benefit analysis (CBA) burst back onto the scene
in the 1980s, it promised to rationalize the regulatory state and
rein in administrators by demanding adherence to a scientifically
informed, quantitative methodology. Critics complained that this
approach slighted the importance of nonwelfarist concerns and
could justify intolerable outcomes, such as gross violations of human dignity. CBA subsequently incorporated deontological and

1

See Part III.A.
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distributive elements—blunting some of the earlier criticisms and
broadening the theory’s appeal, but at significant cost to its motivating principles of efficiency and expertise.2
When popular constitutionalism burst onto the scene in the
2000s, it promised to democratize constitutional law by displacing
the court-centered perspective of judges and scholars and returning the Constitution to the people. Critics complained that this
approach slighted the role of courts in protecting minority rights
and could justify intolerable outcomes, such as mob rule. Popular
constitutionalism subsequently shifted its focus from ordinary citizens to government institutions—blunting some of the earlier
criticisms and broadening the theory’s appeal, but at significant
cost to its motivating principles of lay participation and control. 3
In this Article, we argue that these episodes reflect a general
tendency of prescriptive legal theories, when they blossom into
intellectual movements or schools of thought, to shed many of the
core commitments that made the theories attractive in the first
place. As they develop over time, that is, these theories become not
only increasingly complicated but also increasingly compromised,
by their own normative lights. Maturation breeds adulteration.
The theories work themselves impure.
The tendency of prescriptive legal theories4 to work themselves impure mirrors the tendency of legal rules to evolve into
standards.5 It also has analogues in political science and the history and philosophy of science.6 Yet while we will suggest that the
process of impurification can affect nearly all prescriptive projects
2

See Part III.D.
See Part III.C.
4
By “prescriptive,” we mean “[e]xpressing what must or should be done” by official
actors in a given area of regulation, interpretation, or enforcement. Black’s Law Dictionary
1374 (West 10th ed 2014) (defining “prescriptive”). See also Part I.B (identifying conditions
under which ostensibly descriptive theories may undergo the life cycle). By “legal theories,” we mean coherent groups of propositions that are put forward to guide or explain
particular sets of legal practices. This understanding of theory is broader than the understandings that prevail in some other disciplines, which emphasize testability and falsifiability, but it is consistent with legal academic usage. See Lee Epstein and Gary King, The
Rules of Inference, 69 U Chi L Rev 1, 61 n 188 (2002) (criticizing legal scholarship for defining theory more expansively than other disciplines). But see H.M. Collins, Changing
Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice 34–46 (Sage 1985) (questioning the
significance of falsifiability for theorizing in the natural sciences); Peter Winch, The Idea
of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy 91–94 (Routledge 2d ed 1990) (questioning the significance of falsifiability for theorizing in the social sciences). We consider the
relationship between legal and scientific theory development in Part IV.C.
5
See Part IV.A.1.
6
See Parts IV.B–C.
3
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(and many ostensibly descriptive projects) to some extent,7 there
is a subset of legal theories that are especially likely to work themselves very impure: those theories that seek to negotiate highly
politicized legal conflicts through the introduction of decisionmaking frameworks that abstract away from the central values
in contention. Thus, originalism appealed to the authority of a
univocal constitutional text in response to the conflict sparked by
the Warren and Burger Courts’ expansion of the rights of minorities, women, criminal defendants, and the poor. CBA turned to
the language of economics in response to the conflict sparked by
the activism of agencies tasked with protecting health, safety, and
the environment. And popular constitutionalism heralded the
emergence of a demotic formalism—“the people themselves”—in
response to the conflict sparked by the Rehnquist Court’s rollback
of federal regulatory power.
We submit that the prescriptive legal theories that have
gained the broadest support in public law fields over the past several decades have shared these features of abstraction and proceduralism, together with a common life cycle:8
Birth—At T1, the theory9 introduces a decision procedure or
criterion for judgment that seeks to resolve a highly politicized legal conflict in terms that are relatively alien to the
main points of political contention; in so doing, the theory differentiates itself from preexisting legal theories used to negotiate the conflict.
Critique—At T2, critics of the theory highlight its failure to
secure certain values that gave rise to the conflict in the first
place.
Reformulation—At T3, the theory responds to these critiques
by internalizing them—supplementing or modifying its approach so as to better serve the initially ignored values. As a
7
Among theories with staying power, the principal exceptions either do not seek to
resolve politically contentious legal debates or seek to do so directly, by offering arguments
that on their face support one side of the debate or the other. We discuss these exceptions
in Part I.B.
8
We are grateful to John Danaher for suggesting names for the stages of the life
cycle in an insightful blog post. John Danaher, The Life Cycle of Prescriptive (Legal) Theories
(Philosophical Disquisitions, May 26, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/V6D9-P6C8.
9
“The theory” invoked here is a shorthand for the overlapping efforts of an array of
theorists, whose individual arguments and motivations may differ and whose identities
may change over time. We explain why this internal heterogeneity does not defeat the
possibility of an overarching life cycle, and on the contrary facilitates it, in Parts I.C and II.
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result, the theory’s constituency expands, but at the price of
normative and conceptual purity.
Iteration—At T4, this process of criticism and response recurs.
Maturity—At T5, the theory has come to reflect the conflictridden political and theoretical field it had promised to
transcend. To the extent the theory ever posed a direct threat
to particular participants in the underlying conflict, that danger has dwindled.
Death or Adulterated Persistence—At T6, the theory either
falls out of favor with mainstream legal actors, at least for
the time being, or persists in substantially adulterated
form.10
If this life cycle model accurately captures the developmental
history of some of the most influential public law theories in recent memory—including not only originalism, CBA, and popular
constitutionalism but also the new textualism and possibly others—
then a number of conclusions follow. First, legal theory entrepreneurs are, in general, too optimistic about the transformative
power of their theories. Theories of the sort we describe are unlikely to escape the horizon of the conflicts in which they intervene. Instead, the theories are likely to be transformed by the
conflicts, eventually recapitulating rather than resolving the underlying political disputes.
Second, critics of new prescriptive legal theories are, in general, too pessimistic about the impact such theories will have. Any
theory that successfully attracts a large number of adherents is

10 In a short essay from 1982, Professor Duncan Kennedy suggested that all fundamental distinctions that “constitute the liberal way of thinking about the social world,”
such as public versus private and freedom versus coercion, undergo “an invariant sequence
of six stages . . . from robust good health to utter decrepitude.” Duncan Kennedy, The
Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U Pa L Rev 1349, 1349–50
(1982). We follow Kennedy in combining internalist and externalist modes of analysis to
account for the transformation of legal concepts over time. For an explanation of these
terms, see Mark Tushnet, Book Review, The New Deal Constitutional Revolution: Law,
Politics, or What?, 66 U Chi L Rev 1061, 1061 (1999) (explaining that “[e]xternalists describe developments outside the law and the courts to explain [legal] change,” while “internalists . . . emphasize the role that reasoned distinctions . . . play”) (emphases omitted).
We focus, however, on a different set of transformations and a different set of external
factors. Whereas Kennedy sought to explain what he took to be the decline of the liberal
legal worldview as such, our life cycle theory aims to explain the divergent fates of contemporary prescriptive legal theories—all of which operate within the tenets of the liberal
legal worldview, however “decrepit” those tenets might appear from other perspectives.
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liable to undergo a process of refinement and revision, if not outright appropriation, that will come over time to undermine its
formative goals. An appreciation of these dynamics clarifies connections between legal theorizing and other types of theorizing,
and it might help to lower the temperature of some of the legal
academy’s most heated debates.
Third, the belief that law can “work itself pure” ironically underwrites the contradictions and compromises of prescriptive legal theories.11 Those theories that suggest that a divisive legal
practice can be redeemed, and political debate quieted, through
the adoption of proper decisionmaking techniques always already
contain the seeds of their own decay. There may be an inescapable
trade-off between a legal theory’s ambition to transcend social
conflict and its susceptibility to impurification.
And fourth, the persistence of ever-more-adulterated legal
theories cannot be explained by broad acceptance of their initial
normative commitments, for the price of persistence is the unraveling of those commitments. When such theories endure, we can
expect to find them serving interests or ideals exogenous to their
stated aims. The continuing bipartisan embrace of originalism,
for instance, may be bolstered by its tendency to enhance the political prestige of lawyers or the moral prestige of American nationalism. In any event, the real basis for the persistence of an
adulterated prescriptive legal theory—and the real stakes of that
theory’s persistence—will be only dimly illuminated by the theory
itself.

11 The idea that law, and the common law in particular, “works itself pure” is at least
as old as Lord Mansfield’s declaration from the bench in Omychund v Barker, 26 Eng Rep
15, 23 (Ch 1744) (Mansfield) (emphasis omitted). Two centuries later, Professor Lon Fuller
made this idea famous within the American legal academy. See Lon L. Fuller, The Law in
Quest of Itself 140 (Foundation 1940) (“[T]he common law works itself pure and adapts
itself to the needs of a new day.”). See also Frederick Schauer, Thinking like a Lawyer: A
New Introduction to Legal Reasoning 105 (Harvard 2009) (noting Fuller’s influence).
Fuller’s effort to incorporate legal realism’s understanding of the social function of law
within a procedural account of legal autonomy has, in turn, been recognized as an important contributor to the rise of the legal process school. See Neil Duxbury, Patterns of
American Jurisprudence 261 & n 383 (Clarendon 1995). As discussed in Part I.A, today’s
leading public law theories have important affinities with process jurisprudence in their
aspiration to resolve politically contentious legal conflicts by means of politically neutral
procedural norms. Today’s theories likewise share with earlier accounts of the common
law a belief in the internal rationality of law, although they break with the common-law
model in seeking to fix a unified decision procedure at the outset rather than refine legal
doctrine in an incremental, case-by-case fashion.
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In making these claims, we are aware that theories are not
conscious agents with goals, motivations, or the like. Public law
scholars frequently anthropomorphize the ideas and institutions
they study,12 so to a certain extent our association of legal theories
with intentional states simply follows common parlance. But
given that our life cycle model places special emphasis on a theory’s
departure from “its own” earlier-in-time commitments, some further clarification is in order. The life cycle model depends on the
empirical claim, defended in Part III, that participants in early
debates on originalism, textualism, popular constitutionalism,
and CBA shared common understandings regarding what the theories were about: the reasons they were introduced and the reforms
they would entail. Proponents and opponents of these theories
disputed a great deal, but they agreed on the theories’ central purposes and prescriptions. That agreement is what made debates
over the theories’ merits intelligible. Such common understandings about a theory in its formative years can be recovered and
held up to scrutiny in light of subsequent developments.
We are also keenly aware that the evolutionary process we
describe may produce benefits for law and knowledge, a point addressed in Part V. In light of these potential benefits, the language of “impurity” may strike some readers as unduly pejorative.
But we do not contend that impure theories are bad theories. We
use the language of impurity, instead, to invite the comparison
with accounts of the common law working itself pure and to underscore the loss of normative and decisional clarity that attends
theoretical maturation. A theory that has become impure in our
sense, with an increasingly complex decision procedure and contested normative valence, may well be more attractive than its
“purer” predecessors. Alloys are often stronger than base metals.
It is nonetheless important to keep track of what gets lost over
the course of this progression if prescriptive legal theorists are to
understand the structure of the practice in which they are engaged.

12 See, for example, Barry Friedman and Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U Pa L Rev 1, 33 (1998) (“Originalism seeks to keep faith with our Founders,
while living constitutionalism seeks to keep pace with the times.”); Douglas A. Kysar, It
Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs, 22 J Land Use & Envir L 1, 42
(2006) (“CBA aspires to achieve complete agent-neutrality.”). See also David E. Pozen,
Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale L J 2, 13 (2014) (“[T]he anthropomorphization of the branches is a standard move in constitutional theory.”).
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I. THE OBJECT OF THE LIFE CYCLE THEORY
The life cycle outlined in the Introduction is not equally applicable to all legal theories. Rather, it best captures those theories marked by proceduralism and depoliticization: theories that
seek to negotiate highly politicized legal conflicts through the introduction of decisionmaking frameworks that abstract away
from the central values in contention. This Part proposes to answer why such theories should be privileged objects of analysis,
why they are so susceptible to the impurification process, and why
it is reasonable to treat each such theory as a unitary phenomenon.
A. Proceduralism and Depoliticization in Contemporary Legal
Theory
We focus on theories that promise depoliticization through
proceduralism not only because such theories are especially prone
to the life cycle but also because, in our view, this style of theorizing is especially prominent in contemporary legal scholarship.
Although nothing critical hangs on the exact chronology, one
plausible candidate for dating the (re)emergence of this theoretical style is the 1980s. That decade began with the publication of
Professor John Hart Ely’s landmark book, Democracy and Distrust.
The book developed a justification for “representation-reinforcing”
judicial review that attempted to square the Warren Court’s apparent revival of natural law jurisprudence with the late-stage
legal process theory of Ely’s mentor, Professor Alexander Bickel.13
Within a few years, law review articles were heralding the advent
of a “new legal process” or “new public law” program that sought
to expand upon Ely’s defense of individual rights protection, while
also modernizing process theory’s account of the administrative
state in light of increasingly pointed critiques from public choice,
law and economics, and critical legal studies (CLS).14 Even though
13 John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 101–02
(Harvard 1980).
14 See generally William N. Eskridge Jr and Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 Mich L Rev 707 (1991); Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Book Review, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 Cal L Rev 919 (1989);
A. Michael Froomkin, Book Review, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence
and the New Legal Process, 66 Tex L Rev 1071 (1988); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian
Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 Stan L Rev 213 (1983). Scholars
identified in the foregoing articles as participants in the new legal process include such
diverse figures as Judge Guido Calabresi and Professors Bruce Ackerman, Robert Cover,
William Eskridge, Owen Fiss, Philip Frickey, Gerald Frug, Jonathan Macey, Jerry
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new legal process failed to coalesce as a coherent movement, it
signaled a renewed interest in theories that attempt to vindicate
select high-level values by perfecting the means by which government officials reach legal decisions.
Looking back further in time, one could argue that much contemporary legal theory is best understood as a development
within the older legal process school of the 1950s and 1960s.15 Or
one might argue that the “[p]uzzling [p]ersistence” of processbased theories16 reflects a basic tendency within American legal
culture, if not within law itself, to seek nominal reconciliation of
competing views about the content of public policy; legal theorists
are perpetually redescribing these first-order political conflicts
as—and rerouting them into—comparatively esoteric debates
about the allocation of institutional authority and the rationality
of decisionmaking methods.17 Despite the plausibility of these two
longer narratives, we find the 1980s origin story more felicitous
because the immediately preceding decades remain the last era
in which moralistic argument flowered in American public law.18

Mashaw, Frank Michelman, Andrzej Rapaczynski, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Richard Stewart,
and Cass Sunstein. On the mainstreaming of law and economics within the legal academy
in the 1970s, see Steven M. Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle
for Control of the Law 97–101 (Princeton 2008).
15 See, for example, Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 87 n 20
(Harvard 1982) (arguing that “most current legal scholars, consciously or not, have followed [the] path” of “the legal process school”); Eskridge and Peller, 89 Mich L Rev at 708
(cited in note 14) (“[T]he legal process focus on institutional relationships, the process of
lawmaking, and an overriding standard of purposive coherence continues to dominate public law scholarship.”). Cutting against this story of continuity is the fact that the very notion of a “process school” was mooted only in 1976. See G. Edward White, The American
Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges 404 n 2 (Oxford 1976). See also
Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence at 206 n 3 (cited in note 11) (identifying
Professor G. Edward White as “[t]he writer who first suggested the existence of a process
school”). This late historicization of process theory suggests that the concept itself may
have been an artifact of critique and rehabilitation in the 1970s and 1980s.
16 Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale L J 1063, 1063–65 (1980).
17 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1870–1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy 271 (Oxford 1992) (“The 1950s search for ‘neutral principles’ was
just one more effort to separate law and politics in American culture, one more expression
of the persistent yearning to find an olympian position from which to objectively cushion
the terrors of social choice.”).
18 The 1980s also witnessed a growing prominence and institutionalization of public
law argument by the political right—for example, through the rise of “second generation”
conservative public interest law firms, see Teles, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement at 220–64 (cited in note 14)—although our life cycle account is by no means limited
to “conservative” legal theories.
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The failure of the legal process synthesis to supply generally accepted standards for legal decisionmaking had become undeniable
by the late 1960s, and in the wake of this failure came a series of
“[a]ttempts to reinfuse constitutional law with principles of justice [that] persisted into and throughout the 1970s.”19 Representative of this shift were the many efforts made during this period to
ground constitutional law in Rawlsian political philosophy.20
But then the pendulum swung back.21 The public law theories
that have gained the most traction since the 1970s have retreated
from the open pursuit of justice in favor of a more formalistic, institutionalist orientation. Rawlsian theories of constitutional law
are now a dim memory. So are Marxist and nihilist theories, for
that matter.22 Like their counterparts in the “new legal process”
fold,23 originalism, textualism, popular constitutionalism, and
CBA eschew natural law notions and seek to transcend ordinary
political divides—including the academic divide between “rightwing” versions of law and economics and “explicitly leftist CLS”—
through the establishment of “particular procedures for reaching
decisions about the terms of social life.”24
Today’s leading public law theories depart from the old legal
process in acknowledging the normativity of legal decisionmaking

19 Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public
Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 Tex L Rev 1307, 1316 (1979).
20 See id at 1316–21 (discussing the turn to Rawls). While Professor John Rawls
sometimes characterized his theory of “justice as fairness” as “procedural,” John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice 120 (Belknap 1971), it is generally understood to incorporate principles
of substantive justice. See Joshua Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism, 69 Chi Kent L
Rev 589, 595–97 (1994). See also John Rawls, Political Liberalism 422 n 68 (Columbia
1996) (embracing Professor Joshua Cohen’s account of how “procedural justice depends on
substantive justice”).
21 See Parts II.C, IV.A.2 (discussing connections between the life cycle of individual
legal theories and the larger cycles and epicycles of public law theory).
22 See Tushnet, 57 Tex L Rev at 1309 (cited in note 19) (discussing the choice between
“nihilism” and “Marxis[m]” that CLS would face in the 1980s).
23 Rodriguez, Book Review, 77 Cal L Rev at 919 n 2 (cited in note 14) (including theories
of representation reinforcement, public choice, reconstitutive law, pragmatism, and republicanism within the ambit of new legal process).
24 Eskridge and Peller, 89 Mich L Rev at 762–63 (cited in note 14) (discussing a range
of “recent public law work” circa 1991). That this centrism mirrored traditional legal process in its search for a middle ground between anti–New Deal formalism and pro–New
Deal legal realism was not lost on proponents of new legal process. See id at 763–64 (stating that both sets of process-oriented theories “embody the attempt to mediate the ideological polarization of legal discourse”).
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and accepting that “no issues are simply ‘procedural.’” 25 For instance, popular constitutionalism and originalism generally locate their legitimacy in popular sovereignty or popular ratification of the Constitution, while CBA generally privileges the
substantive norm of social welfare. Yet in their focus on the manner in which legal authority is exercised, these theories have resurrected the process school’s founding commitment to the autonomous validity of law.26 Such theories are proceduralist to the
extent that they define valid legal decisions as those reached by
appropriate procedures or persons. Such theories are depoliticized to the extent that the decisionmaking models they recognize
as valid abstract from the politically divisive values at stake in a
given legal conflict.
In short, for all of its internal diversity, mainstream public
law theory has operated within a certain template since at least
the 1980s. This template seeks to accommodate normative conflict, linguistic indeterminacy, and regulatory complexity by
means of proceduralism and depoliticization. The result is a recipe for impurification.
B. Susceptibility to the Life Cycle
Ever since the New Deal shifted the center of gravity in
American law toward federal regulation, public law conflicts have
garnered the lion’s share of political attention.27 Accordingly, one

25 Id at 762 (emphasis added). As critics noted, traditional process jurisprudence itself depended on an implicit normative account of the appropriate means and ends of legal
process: “principle[d]” reasons of decision and “valid human wants.” Duxbury, Patterns of
American Jurisprudence at 262–64 (cited in note 11) (emphases added).
26 In other words, today’s leading public law theories aim both to shore up weaknesses of the old legal process and to resist those intellectually extreme forms of law and
economics and CLS that threaten the very enterprise of conventional legal scholarship and
education. See Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law at 269–70 (cited in note 17)
(describing law and economics, CLS, and various natural rights theories as the three main
challengers to traditional legal process between 1960 and 1990). On the institutional and
vocational imperatives that favored process jurisprudence, both at mid-century and during
the 1980s, see Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927–1960 226–31 (North Carolina 1986).
27 See Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 81–88 (Yale 2d ed 2014). See also
Charles D. Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 Colum L Rev 749, 766 (1965) (contrasting the adjudication of private law disputes with “the public and political controversy engendered by
issues involved in public law”); Harold Hongju Koh, The Globalization of Freedom, 26 Yale
J Intl L 305, 308 (2001) (noting “the major shift in the focus of American law school curriculum and scholarship after the New Deal [ ] away from the teaching of private law toward the teaching of public law”).
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can expect a large and interested audience for any theory promising resolution of a significant public law controversy. And that is
the implied promise of the theories we describe: by reorienting
official practice around new methods or criteria for public law decisionmaking, such theories hold out the hope of resolving politically contentious legal conflicts without reference to the primary
values in contention.
These theories are so susceptible to being compromised because of the way in which they seek to forge compromise. On the
one hand, these theories inject reformist ideas into debates that
are perceived to matter a great deal. Participants are likely to be
sensitive to such efforts and to register their discontent if they
suspect any given proposal of privileging certain interests at the
expense of their own agendas. On the other hand, these theories
intervene in an abstract fashion, without speaking directly to the
issues that animate participants on either side. Originalism and
popular constitutionalism, for example, supply guidance about
how the Constitution should be interpreted and by whom, but
they have nothing explicit to say about which substantive goods
society should prioritize or what the legal rules should be regarding abortion, health care, or any other public policy matter. This
abstraction may reduce backlash in the short term, but it also creates conceptual space within the terms of the theory to incorporate competing perspectives on the underlying conflict.
A fundamental tension emerges. The goal of proceduralism
and depoliticization is to overcome, or appear to overcome, the divisions within a preexisting legal conflict. To achieve this goal, a
theory must build a broad base of support that minimizes partisan taint. And so proceduralist, depoliticized theories must respond to at least some of the criticisms that their initial formulations engender. At the same time that this responsiveness allows
the theories to broaden their bases, however, it leads them down
the path of adulteration. The theories will become less purely procedural and more obviously charged with politically divisive
meanings as newer iterations seek to appease constituencies that
insist on the inviolability of various first-order commitments.
Generally speaking, then, we have reason to predict (and case
studies to suggest) that the legal theories most susceptible to the
life cycle will be those that seek to negotiate highly politicized legal conflicts by prescribing decisionmaking methods that abstract
away from the central values in contention. Theories that do not
seek to intervene in such conflicts—ones that address, say, an
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overlooked body of doctrine—are less likely to face critical audiences that demand adulteration or to feel the same need to appease such critics. For the historically contingent reason given
above, this suggests that private law theories may be less likely
to experience the life cycle; the balance of highly politicized legal
conflicts occur today in public law.28
At least three types of prescriptive legal theories that do intervene in politically contentious legal conflicts may also depart
from our paradigm and avoid the life cycle. First, some may endorse decision procedures that are so fluid or underspecified that
partisans cannot tell which values or interests their adoption
would ultimately favor, disfavor, or displace. Examples here
might include theories of experimentalism in public administration29 and theories of pluralism or multiple modalities in constitutional interpretation.30 A theory that is highly open-ended at
the outset—agnostic on key questions of procedure as well as substance—will have few, if any, foundational goals to be compromised. It is impure by design.
Second, other theories may engage with a political conflict in
a direct and substantive manner, rather than in an abstract, procedural register. In consequence, they may escape the critique
that they have ignored the values most salient to the conflict, as
well as the obligation to seek consensus validation. Examples
here might include Professor Robin West’s theory of progressive
constitutionalism and Professor Randy Barnett’s and Professor
Richard Epstein’s theories of libertarian constitutionalism, each
of which is grounded in contested normative commitments.31

28

See note 27 and accompanying text.
See generally, for example, Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Minimalism
and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 Georgetown L J 53 (2011); James
S. Liebman and Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The
Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 NYU Rev L & Soc Change
183 (2003).
30 See generally, for example, Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford 1982); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72
Tex L Rev 1753 (1994); Richard H. Fallon Jr, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv L Rev 1189 (1987).
31 See generally Robin West, Progressive Constitutionalism: Reconstructing the
Fourteenth Amendment (Duke 1994); Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution:
The Presumption of Liberty (Princeton 2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal
Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited Government (Harvard 2014).
29
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These openly ideological arguments will face other, potentially severe, challenges in the marketplace of legal ideas, but impurification is less likely to be one of them.
And third, a prescriptive legal theory that fails to gain an
early base of support will not be perceived as a threat by key participants in any conflict. Its purity will be maintained at the expense of marginalization. Examples here are endless. The vast
majority of proposed legal theories never leave the realm of the
obscure.
All that we have said so far concerns prescriptive legal theories; what of their descriptive counterparts? To the extent that
any legal theory can be considered purely descriptive,32 we suspect that it will prove relatively impervious to the life cycle. Because such a theory will not seek to dictate particular legal outcomes, it will have less of a need to expand its constituency and
will be less likely to receive pushback from the many parties opposed to those outcomes. In the absence of such wide-ranging resistance, a descriptive theory could avoid significant impurification and still survive (although, like all theories, it might undergo
a certain amount of transformation in response to critique). And
while a descriptive legal theory, like any theory, needs commentators to affirm its worth, a prescriptive theory will generally
need more, and more influential, supporters to bring about a desired change in the law. In pursuit of these supporters, concessions must be made, adulterations admitted.
That being said, our model is open to the possibility that the
descriptive/prescriptive distinction is better conceived of as a
spectrum than as a hard-and-fast dichotomy. Many positive theorists have prescriptive motivations. Many descriptive theories entail, or may be seen as entailing, certain sorts of legal outcomes
that are subsequently “exposed” and critiqued on moral or policy
grounds. Law and economics is perhaps the most significant example of an ostensibly descriptive theory of law (at least as classically formulated) that has been understood by both proponents

32 See Jack Goldsmith and Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal
Scholarship, 69 U Chi L Rev 153, 155 (2002) (arguing that legal scholarship characteristically melds “[d]octrinal, interpretive, and normative” elements and primarily “seeks to
persuade”); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 Mich L
Rev 1835, 1847 (1988) (arguing that the distinguishing “feature of standard legal scholarship is its prescriptive voice, its consciously declared desire to improve the performance of
legal decisionmakers”).
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and opponents to have a normative thrust.33 In such cases, descriptive theories may experience life cycle effects—as indeed has
happened with law and economics.34 In general, susceptibility to
the life cycle turns on whether a given theory is widely perceived
as likely to influence, and not just diagnose, official legal practice
through the introduction of a depoliticized decision procedure.35
C. An Adulterated Theory or Multiple Theories?
This Article treats as single objects of analysis legal “theories” the contents of which are, at this writing, highly contested.
Would it not be more appropriate to treat theoretical terms such
as originalism or textualism as names designating sets of legal
theories that share a family resemblance, but not necessarily a
common life cycle? This question has more than semantic significance, as our own theory contends that the very capaciousness of
originalism and textualism is attributable to a process of adulteration rather than elective affinity.
Nonetheless, we think that the question has two relatively
simple empirical answers. First, theories and theoretical terms
have origins. And at its origin, as Part III.A discusses, “originalism” meant something fairly specific to its supporters and critics.
To be sure, individual supporters and critics disagreed with each

33 See, for example, Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of
Critical Legal Studies, in Peter Newman, ed, 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law 465, 471 (Macmillan 1998) (describing increasingly bipartisan efforts to bend
“the apparently value neutral, technocratic discourse of efficiency” invoked by law and
economics toward preexisting political ends); Michael W. McConnell, The Counter-Revolution
in Legal Thought, 41 Pol Rev 18, 23–24 (1987) (arguing that while law and economics “has
no overt ideological element,” “law and economics scholars will—with only rare exceptions—
take positions compatible with libertarian conservatives”).
34 We will soon turn to the specific life cycle of CBA, a prescriptive public law theory
with roots in law and economics. See Part III.D. As that story suggests, the law and economics movement’s original focus on maximizing efficiency or wealth, as well as its association with deregulation and conservative politics, has yielded over time to much more
complex formulations. For some early efforts to move law and economics in a liberal direction, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics—and the New Administrative Law, 98 Yale L J 341, 341 (1988) (advocating “the development of a reformist law
and economics”); Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan L Rev 387, 387 n 1 (1981) (collecting sources from “the ‘liberal’ law and
economics school”).
35 Accordingly, our own life cycle model—if it were to become popular and perceived
as likely to influence legal practice—would also be susceptible to impurification through
exceptions and modifications that come to blunt whatever prescriptive force it was initially
thought to possess.
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other on numerous levels. But even to have these debates required the existence of some minimal consensus view of the
emerging theory: an understanding of its basic assumptions, prescriptions, and goals that few participants would have disputed.
This consensus is a social and historical fact about the legal community at a particular moment in time. It is precisely because of
the intellectual and political setbacks and successes experienced
by this original “originalism” that the term—and the theoretical
school that embraced it—gradually became more complex, capacious, and even at times self-contradictory.
Second, however diverse a given theoretical school may become and however disparate the motivations of those operating
within it may be, members of the theoretical school generally remain committed to the theory’s initial decisional formalism.
Originalists do not abandon the decisional centrality of the constitutional text; textualists do not abandon the decisional centrality of the statutory text; cost-benefit analysts do not abandon the
decisional centrality of a calculus of trade-offs; and popular constitutionalists do not abandon the decisional centrality of “the
people,” even as they locate “the people” in more rarified institutional settings. This fixation on a theory’s initial formalism, despite increasingly significant intellectual and political differences
among its proponents, belies an account of family resemblance or
elective affinity.36 This fixation strikes us, instead, as strong evidence of the adulteration of a common source—which is to say,
strong evidence of life cycle effects.
We should note that in assessing the development of these
theoretical schools, our method is to examine the claims made in
a theory’s name not only by law professors but also by government
officials, public intellectuals, and movement activists. Such a
broad description of a theory’s social base is open to the objection
that it stacks the deck in favor of a finding of adulteration. For
instance, by sharply distinguishing academic from judicial and
popular invocations of a theory, one might be able to redescribe
internal diversity and discord as the existence of multiple, relatively harmonious theoretical schools.

36 This fixation on a theory’s initial formalism may also help to explain the persistence of a theory long after its other initial assumptions and prescriptions have been abandoned and no longer constitute part of the consensus view of the theory. See Part V.B.
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This objection strikes us as misplaced. Even within the confines of the academy, all of the theories under discussion have become highly adulterated.37 Furthermore, any effort to segregate
academic from nonacademic invocations of a given theory would
be in considerable tension with the structure of prescriptive legal
theorizing. Such theorizing necessarily seeks, at some level, to attract nonacademic adherents: government officials in particular,
as well as those who have the power to influence those officials.
To restrict the inquiry to any single discursive community would
be to miss the interpenetration of scholarly, governmental, and
popular discourses that drives the development of these theories.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE LIFE CYCLE
We now turn to the life cycle itself. It bears emphasis at the
outset that our model is the product of an induction over a limited
number of cases: those theories that have achieved widespread
popularity in American public law during the past several decades.
We do not claim to have identified any precise metric for assessing
a theory’s popularity or “impurity,” much less any transcendent
truth about law. Nevertheless, given the significance of the examples we have included and the historical trend they appear to represent, we feel reasonably confident that our model has predictive
as well as descriptive power. At least for the foreseeable future,
any process-oriented public law theory that attracts extensive
support can be expected to arrive at a state of impurity. This Part
elaborates on the stages of the life cycle, including the drivers and
dynamics of the impurification process.
A. Stage One: Theory Birth
At T1, the theory introduces a decision procedure or criterion
for judgment that seeks to resolve a highly politicized legal
conflict in terms that are relatively alien to the main points
37 One could argue, of course, that what we call “adulteration” within the academy is
better explained as the splintering of one theory into multiple theories, even in cases in
which all of the relevant academics claim to adhere to a single theory. In this vein, some
self-proclaimed originalists contend that other self-proclaimed originalists are not truly
originalists. This kind of argument, although often couched in descriptive terms, is really
an argument about which rules an originalist ought to follow or promote. The best a descriptive (meta-)theory such as ours can do is to acknowledge and assess this disagreement
from an external perspective. For our purposes at least, any effort to reinterpret the
disagreement in terms of the existence of multiple, internally consistent prescriptive legal
theories would produce a less accurate description of the theoretical field.
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of political contention; in so doing, the theory differentiates
itself from preexisting legal theories used to negotiate the
conflict.
As noted above, the theories we see as most prone to the life
cycle arise out of specific sociolegal conflicts. These conflicts are
about legal questions, such as the best way for judges to interpret
the Constitution or for administrators to implement statutes, but
they have clear political stakes and identifiable political blocs.
When originalism emerged as a theory of constitutional interpretation, for instance, it was widely understood to reflect “conservative frustration with the broad, rights-expansive decisions of the
Warren and Burger Courts” in areas such as criminal procedure
and reproductive choice.38 When popular constitutionalism
emerged some two decades later, it was widely understood to reflect liberal frustration with the broad, rights-constrictive decisions of the Rehnquist Court in areas such as antidiscrimination
law.39 The market for a new prescriptive legal theory begins to
expand as the leading theories of the day come to be seen either
as partial to one side of the conflict or as unresponsive to both
sides—as doing too much political work or too little. By the time
originalism arrived on the scene in the 1970s, “fundamental values” and other explicitly moral theories of constitutional interpretation had become associated with liberal and Democratic projects,40
38 Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 Georgetown L J 713,
716 (2011). See also, for example, Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 Fordham L Rev 545, 554–55 (2006) (“No politically literate person could miss the point that the Reagan Administration’s use of
originalism marked, and was meant to mark, a set of distinctively conservative objections
to the liberal precedents of the Warren Court.”); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol 599, 601 (2004) (“[O]riginalism was a reactive theory
motivated by substantive disagreement with the recent and then-current actions of the
Warren and Burger Courts; originalism was largely developed as a mode of criticism of
those actions.”).
39 See, for example, Jamal Greene, Book Review, Giving the Constitution to the
Courts, 117 Yale L J 886, 918 (2008) (“Just as many conservatives sought refuge from the
individual rights decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts in a jurisprudence of original
intent, some liberal academics have sought to rebut the Rehnquist Court’s structural critique by resort to popular constitutionalism in all its sundry guises.”).
40 See Johnathan G. O’Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration of Originalism, 96 Nw
U L Rev 253, 268–69 (2001) (discussing Professor Raoul Berger’s critique of the “fundamental
values” approach favored by “legal liberals”); Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/
Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L J 453, 544 (1989) (noting “the familiar view of [Griswold v
Connecticut] as a paradigmatic example of an ‘activist’ Court seeking to keep the living
constitution up to date by imposing its own idea of ‘fundamental values’”); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U Cin L Rev 849, 863 (1989) (criticizing fundamental
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whereas prominent alternatives such as structuralism had never
aligned closely with any ideological camp.41
Against this backdrop, the new theory introduces an approach to legal decisionmaking that purports to advance a certain
high-level end, such as democracy, judicial constraint, or social
welfare, without committing to any of the political blocs that constitute the poles of the conflict. The theory may be inaugurated
by one side or the other, as with the conservative push for
originalism or the liberal push for popular constitutionalism. But
its prescriptions are held out as uniquely attractive and legitimate regardless of which groups or which values end up winning
in any given case. While proponents do not necessarily tout the
theory’s substantive “neutrality”—conventional CBA, for example, was openly oriented around the pursuit of economic efficiency42—they do claim a kind of relative neutrality. They promise
an approach that allows official decisionmakers to avoid choosing
directly among the competing political blocs and their first-order
preferences. People of all stripes, it is claimed, should be willing
to accept the theory in principle.
The precise date of birth for these theories can be difficult to
pinpoint. The theory may be introduced (or reintroduced in modern form) in a foundational work or set of works, on which sympathetic commentators seek to build: Judge Robert Bork’s 1971
article Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems43
and Professor Raoul Berger’s 1977 book Government by Judiciary44
are often said to have played this role in the case of originalism,

values and related theories as an invitation to “judicial personalization of the law” and
contending that “[m]ost if not all” such theorists “would strike down the death penalty”).
41 See Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 Iowa L Rev 1, 30 n 210 (2006) (noting that structuralism of the sort theorized by Professor Charles Black “has been a staple in conservative and liberal commentary and judicial opinions alike”). See also generally Charles L. Black Jr, Structure and
Relationship in Constitutional Law 3–32 (Louisiana State 1969).
42 See, for example, Sidney A. Shapiro and Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond CostBenefit Analysis: A Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 Harv Envir L Rev 433, 446–50 (2008) (observing that the adoption of CBA in the 1980s and in earlier periods was justified as a
means “to promote economic efficiency”); Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Rethinking
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L J 165, 186 (1999) (“The purpose of CBA, as typically
understood, is to separate out the distributional issue and isolate the efficiency issue, so
that the agency will evaluate projects solely on the basis of their efficiency.”).
43 See generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 Ind L J 1 (1971).
44 See generally Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Harvard 1977).
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which crystallized as a distinctive interpretive approach in the
1980s.45 Alternatively, the theory may be propounded in a range
of contemporaneous works, leaving its pedigree more obscure.
Among those who help to launch a prescriptive legal theory, some
may be motivated by broad moral goals, some by narrow policy
goals, some by professional advancement or personal renown,
some by intellectual curiosity, some by the pursuit of truth, and
some by a complicated mix of each of these factors and perhaps
others as well. It may be the case that legal commentators face
especially strong incentives to offer ambitious new theories,
which will then have to be scaled back, on account of the preferences of law review editors or the dynamics of legal intellectual
influence.46 But we need not delve too deeply into the determinants of legal theory entrepreneurship, as our focus is on aggregate sociological effects rather than individual behaviors. No matter what accounts for their genesis, all theories with the formal
features we identify are susceptible to the life cycle. Once such a
theory is born, its parents cannot control its ultimate life path.
B. Stages Two through Five: The Dialectic of Impurification
At T2, critics of the theory highlight its failure to secure certain values that gave rise to the conflict in the first place.
At T3, the theory responds to these critiques by internalizing
them—supplementing or modifying its approach so as to better serve the initially ignored values. As a result, the theory’s
constituency expands, but at the price of normative and conceptual purity.
At T4, this process of criticism and response recurs.
At T5, the theory has come to reflect the conflict-ridden political and theoretical field it had promised to transcend. To the
extent the theory ever posed a direct threat to particular participants in the underlying conflict, that danger has dwindled.

45 See Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Possibilities and Practical Differences, 87 Notre Dame L Rev 253, 267 n 78 (2011) (“[O]riginalism’s modern incarnation beg[an] in the 1970s, with the publication of [Bork’s article and
Berger’s book].”). Another work cited in this vein is William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of
a Living Constitution, 54 Tex L Rev 693 (1976). As these examples reflect, the theoretical
turn toward legal process that we have associated with the 1980s, see Part I.A, had some
important antecedents in the 1970s.
46 This Article certainly does not dispel the possibility.
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Most theories that are introduced each year go nowhere.
Even if they manage to attract attention, they fail to spark followon inquiry, much less develop into a recognizable school of
thought.47 The question of why certain legal theories develop into
intellectual and social movements is highly contextual and
largely beyond the scope of this study.48 The one point we wish to
raise in this regard is that, in the current legal process–inflected
era, those prescriptive theories that lack an abstract, procedural
orientation start with a competitive disadvantage.49 The susceptibility of a theory to the life cycle, that is, may be not only a product
of its success in gaining a wide range of adherents but also a
condition precedent for achieving such success in the first place.50
Whatever propels them forward, some prescriptive theories
of the sort we describe do blossom into intellectual movements.
And when this happens, impurification follows. Through an iterative process of contestation and reformulation, the theories become increasingly unmoored from the goals that were articulated
to justify their adoption, adrift from their raisons d’être. The details of this evolutionary process are also highly contextual, to be
sure, but the process itself is not so complex or contingent as to
preclude a stylized model. The key development occurs at T3 (and
may recur numerous times thereafter), when normative objections to the theory are not simply parried by those speaking in the
name of the theory but rather are incorporated into the theory
itself, through refinements designed to address the objections.
This is the moment, to put it provocatively, when the theory begins to cannibalize itself.
Why and how do these self-defeating shifts occur? In a typical
case, several mechanisms combine to produce the phenomenon.
Some of these mechanisms may affect individual theorists who

47 See Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 San Diego L Rev 309, 336 (2007) (reporting that “[f]orty-three percent of [law review] articles are not cited at all, and about
79% get ten or fewer citations”).
48 For an analysis of the conditions under which “scientific/intellectual movements”
are most likely to emerge and succeed, see generally Scott Frickel and Neil Gross, A General Theory of Scientific/Intellectual Movements, 70 Am Sociological Rev 204 (2005).
49 See Part I.A. In light of the greater political salience of public law disputes, see
notes 27–28 and accompanying text, we think this point holds especially true in public law
fields.
50 See Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 Ohio St L J 1183, 1199
(2011) (“A protean disposition is necessary for a [constitutional] methodology to successfully validate a diverse set of political objectives with equilibria in both our past and our
future.”).
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modify their views over time, while others rely on an influx of new
commentators who continually criticize and revise the theory.
Key impurifying agents include:51
Political feedback effects. As the new theory encounters criticism about morally relevant information that it excludes or about
substantive values and social groups that it disfavors, notwithstanding its ostensibly depoliticized character, proponents may
suggest revisions intended to broaden or maintain the theory’s
appeal. Early versions of originalism that seemed hard to reconcile with Brown v Board of Education of Topeka,52 for example,
were jettisoned in part to “make originalism safe for Brown” and
the principle of racial equality that the canonical case embodies.53
The theory of originalism thereafter became harder to typecast as
radical or right leaning in its methodological demands and policy
implications.
Professional feedback effects. While impurification is partly
driven by the need to incorporate discordant political views, it also
follows from epistemic and practical weaknesses of the theory that
only become apparent over time. As the new theory encounters
criticism about such weaknesses, proponents may suggest revisions intended to make the initial idea not just more politically
palatable but also more intellectually and institutionally sound
or a better fit with prevailing legal norms, in ways that redound
to their reputational benefit and attract partisans of alternative
theoretical approaches. The theory becomes more sophisticated
and less grandiose.54 Early versions of originalism that relied on
idiosyncratic notions of the Framers’ intent, for example, were jettisoned in part to make the theory more coherent, if less constraining.55 What we are calling a process of impurification can
thus be seen as a process of purification from another perspective:
the very moves that undermine the theory’s initial normative aspirations may be ones that make it conceptually richer and more
refined.
51 For a discussion of additional adaptive behaviors that facilitate the life cycle, see
text accompanying notes 215–19.
52 347 US 483 (1954).
53 Jed Rubenfeld, Reply to Commentators, 115 Yale L J 2093, 2098 (2006).
54 See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays 3–4 (Basic
Books 1973) (observing that certain ideas that seem to “resolve [ ] many fundamental problems at once” periodically “burst upon the intellectual landscape with a tremendous force”
and then, with the exception of “zealots,” commentators “settle down after a while to the
problems the idea has really generated”).
55 See Part III.A.
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Fragmentation and co-optation. As the new theory is elaborated by more and more commentators, differences of opinion may
emerge and eventually crystallize into competing versions of the
theory, further compromising the objectives of its founders. Some
of the second- and third-generation commentators who speak in
the theory’s name may not share those objectives at all, and may
even wish to subvert them. Originalism, as Professor James
Fleming observes, has now experienced both balkanization into
rival camps and Balkinization, or “what happens when originalism becomes so inclusive that even Yale law professor Jack Balkin,
hitherto a pragmatic living constitutionalist, becomes an
originalist.”56
Churches can excommunicate those who peddle false versions of their creed. Political parties may be able to withhold endorsements and financial support from those who defy the party
line. Intellectual movements have no comparable tools to weed
out saboteurs from sympathizers or to ensure internal discipline—perhaps especially if they are led by professors whose compensation derives largely from fixed, school-specific salaries (as in
law) rather than competitive, centralized grants. As a prescriptive legal theory becomes increasingly influential, the universe of
people who identify with the theory not only expands in size but
also changes in composition, becoming more ideologically diverse
and representative of the overall population of lawyers. Purists
are absorbed into the crowd.
C. Stage Six: Theory Death and Theory Persistence
At T6, the theory either falls out of favor with mainstream
legal actors, at least for the time being, or persists in substantially adulterated form.
The life cycle reaches its end once a prescriptive legal theory,
as expressed by prominent commentators and applied by public
officials, becomes incapable of fulfilling the distinctive normative
functions—including decisional clarity—it was created to fulfill.
But life and law go on. One of two basic fates awaits a theory at T6.
The first is theory death. Legal thinkers and decisionmakers
may gradually set aside an adulterated theory as a needless complication or obfuscation of the initial conflict, until at some point
56 James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution: For Moral Readings and
against Originalisms 2 (Oxford 2015).
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the theory ceases to claim new adherents. Such a slide toward
irrelevance seems to be happening at this moment to popular constitutionalism.57 Although the impurification process we describe
may have a dialectical cast, it does not necessarily yield durable
syntheses.58
Importantly, however, abandonment of a theory may be only
temporary. Today’s originalism is the successor to last generation’s “interpretivism.”59 Today’s CBA is the latest successor to
versions of CBA dating back to the New Deal era.60 Both theories
have older intellectual roots. A prescriptive legal theory may fade
away at T6 only to be reborn, years later, in a slightly revised and
relabeled form.61 And then the impurification process starts again.
Our life cycle theory is thus consonant with a larger epicyclical account of legal theory development.
The second fate is that of stubborn persistence. Even if it no
longer serves its motivating purposes, an adulterated theory may
continue to command allegiance because it serves social interests
that are unrelated to those purposes. There are many reasons, for
instance, why contemporary left liberals may wish to associate
themselves with originalism and CBA, as we explore in Part V.

57 See Helen J. Knowles and Julianne A. Toia, Defining “Popular Constitutionalism”:
The Kramer versus Kramer Problem, 42 S U L Rev 31, 55–56 (2014) (finding that usage of
the term “popular constitutionalism” in law journals has dropped precipitously over the
past five to ten years). We will have more to say about popular constitutionalism’s decline
in Parts III.C and V.B.
58 For this reason, among others, we do not find it useful to draw on a formal theory
of dialectics, whether Hegelian or Marxist. We do note an affinity between our model and
the dialectical vision of Professors Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, insofar as their
vision suggests that assertions of rational progress have a built-in tendency to revert to
struggles over power. See generally Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of
Enlightenment (Continuum 2d ed 1988) (John Cumming, trans). Here too, though, the
connection is so tenuous that it does not seem worth developing.
59 See Dennis J. Goldford, The American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism 90–121 (Cambridge 2005) (describing “the evolution of the interpretivism debate into
the originalism debate”).
60 See Daniel H. Cole, Law, Politics, and Cost–Benefit Analysis, 64 Ala L Rev 55, 56
(2012) (“Formal CBA has been around since the New Deal when President Roosevelt’s
National Planning Board . . . began commissioning economic analyses of public works
projects.”).
61 Such revising and relabeling of faded theories need not be self-conscious and, on
the contrary, may be facilitated by lack of familiarity with prior scholarship. See, for example, Mark Tushnet, Harry Kalven and Kenneth Karst in The Supreme Court Review:
Reflections after Fifty Years, 2010 S Ct Rev 35, 35 (suggesting that many of “the questions
that [constitutional] scholars today regard as deep were already present, though sometimes submerged, in [ ] articles” published fifty years ago).
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But those reasons have little to do with disciplining judges or administrators or with maximizing economic efficiency or fidelity to
the constitutional text.
III. CASE STUDIES
Having laid out the general framework of our model, we now
turn to case studies to help illustrate its workings. This Part reviews the intellectual history of several prominent legal theories
through the lens of the life cycle. As suggested above, there is a
conventional narrative regarding when theories such as originalism and textualism emerged and what they were “about” during
this formative period. We sketch these origin stories, which establish a baseline for understanding what the theories were meant
to accomplish, and then trace the theories’ development in the
years that followed. These case studies proceed in a necessarily
summary fashion; a detailed version of any one of them would be
an article unto itself. Nevertheless, we believe that the discussions below (and the more exhaustive historical treatments on
which some of them draw) are sufficient to demonstrate that the
life cycle model plausibly fits the evidence—that it provides a parsimonious and consilient account not only of why these theories
have evolved in the manner that they have, but also of how these
seemingly disparate episodes in public law reform are in fact
closely connected.62

62

We focus on four episodes that strike us as particularly important and revealing,
but the life cycle model might be applied to numerous other theories as well. We suspect,
for example, that judicial minimalism of the sort advocated by Professor Cass Sunstein,
see generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme
Court (Harvard 1999), experienced impurification as theorists following Sunstein sought
to characterize various exercises of judicial power either as legitimate exceptions to minimalism or (more commonly) as appropriate applications of minimalism, properly understood. See Michael S. Greve, Atlas Croaks. Supreme Court Shrugs., 6 Charleston L Rev 15,
32 n 79 (2011) (complaining that “judicial minimalism in theory means maximalism in
fact”). Looking ahead, Sunstein’s influential theory of “nudging,” see generally Richard H.
Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Yale 2008), may be an interesting candidate for impurification. If the prescribed
nudging strategies become increasingly transparent and private choice respecting (and
thus politically popular) in response to criticisms of excessive paternalism and manipulation, they may also become increasingly ineffective at pushing people toward regulators’
desired outcomes. Outside of law, Danaher has suggested that the theory of effective altruism fits our model. See generally Danaher, The Life Cycle of Prescriptive (Legal) Theories (cited in note 8).
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A. From Old Originalism to New Originalism
The story of originalism’s theoretical evolution has been told
numerous times in recent years,63 so we will aim to be as concise
as possible here. As already indicated, contemporary originalist
theory arose out of conservative frustration with the “activist”
constitutional rulings of the Warren and Burger Courts;64 received influential articulations in the 1970s from Professor Berger,
Judge Bork, and then–Associate Justice William Rehnquist;65 and
rose to public prominence in the mid-1980s following the advocacy
of Attorney General Edwin Meese.66 In these early years, originalists urged a “jurisprudence of original intention,”67 according to
which judges would be required to follow “the specific intentions
of the Framers . . . regarding how a specific provision was meant
to apply to specific issues.”68 This methodology was defended on

63 Useful histories of contemporary originalist theory include Johnathan O’Neill,
Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History 111–216 (Johns Hopkins
2005), Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 716–36 (cited in note 38), Lawrence B. Solum, What Is
Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in Grant Huscroft and
Bradley W. Miller, eds, The Challenge of Originalism: Theories of Constitutional Interpretation 12, 13–27 (Cambridge 2011), Thomas B. Colby and Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 Duke L J 239, 247–62 (2009), and Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Georgetown L J
1113, 1134–48 (2003). But see Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L Rev 453, 462 (2013) (“A comprehensive history of originalist theorizing has yet to be written.”). Professor Lawrence Solum has recently begun to sketch a
revisionist account of originalism’s history, according to which originalism emerged as a
coherent theory of constitutional interpretation only in the 1980s and thenceforth evolved
from an inchoate and indeterminate “mélange” of ideas into an increasingly consistent
view. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L Rev 1, 4 (2015). This Article relies largely on the standard
story of originalism’s development. While Solum’s revisionist account may call into question aspects of this story with regard to a specialized scholarly literature, we continue to
believe that the story well captures the trajectory of originalism in academic, judicial, and
popular commentary more broadly. See Part I.C (defending our decision to consider nonacademic as well as academic invocations of a theory).
64 See note 38 and accompanying text.
65 See notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
66 See O’Neill, Originalism in American Law and Politics at 146–60 (cited in note 63);
Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy: Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 Stud Am Polit Dev 61, 75–82 (2009).
67 This was the famous phrase used in Meese’s first originalism speech. See Edwin
Meese III, Speech before the American Bar Association, in Steven G. Calabresi, ed,
Originalism: A Quarter-Century of Debate 47, 50–54 (Regnery 2007).
68 Kesavan and Paulsen, 91 Georgetown L J at 1135 (cited in note 63). “[E]xtrapolations from that intention” could be used when dealing with “modern issues not within the
specific contemplation of the Framers or the Ratifiers.” Id.
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democratic and rule of law grounds. But the “primary commitment” of originalist theory in the 1970s and 1980s, as many have
observed, “was to judicial restraint.”69 Constraining judges
through text and history was held out to be the theory’s central
virtue and objective. “Originalist methods of constitutional interpretation were understood as a means to that end.”70
Original intent originalism met with a variety of objections.
One line of critique called attention to the difficulties of recovering and applying the Framers’ (possibly quite varied) intentions.71
Another line of critique claimed that the Framers did not intend
for their own subjective intentions to be controlling. 72 A third line
of critique emphasized that a jurisprudence of original intent
might be at odds with celebrated decisions such as Brown, as
some of originalism’s early proponents had openly acknowledged.73
In response to these objections, originalism underwent a series of transformations. The focus of inquiry moved from the intentions of the Framers to the understandings of the ratifiers to
the “original public meaning” of the constitutional text, or how
the words of the Constitution “would have been understood by an
ordinary, reasonably well-informed user of the language, in context, at the time, within the relevant political community that
adopted them.”74 Justice Antonin Scalia helped catalyze this move
in a 1986 speech that called on originalists “to change the label
from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original

69 Whittington, 2 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol at 602 (cited in note 38). See also, for
example, Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 717 (cited in note 38) (“It would be difficult to overstate the extent to which the Old Originalism was characterized by its own proponents as
a theory that could constrain judges.”); Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”:
Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 BU L Rev 677, 690 (2005) (“The old originalism was designed to promote judicial restraint and criticize the judicial innovations of
liberal judges.”).
70 Whittington, 2 Georgetown J L & Pub Pol at 602 (cited in note 38).
71 See, for example, Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 BU L Rev 204, 209–22 (1980). A parallel line of critique emphasized that it was the
Constitution’s manifold ratifiers, not the forty-odd delegates in Philadelphia, who conferred legal and democratic legitimacy on the document. Id at 214–15.
72 See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 Harv L Rev 885 (1985).
73 See, for example, Berger, Government by Judiciary at 117–33 (cited in note 44);
Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem—the Role of the Intent of the Framers
in Constitutional Theory, 63 BU L Rev 811, 846–50 (1983).
74 Kesavan and Paulsen, 91 Georgetown L J at 1144–45 (cited in note 63) (citation
omitted).
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Meaning.”75 In addition to the turn to public meaning, originalists
generally came to embrace a distinction between “constitutional
interpretation” (understood as the effort to discern the text’s communicative content) and “constitutional construction” (understood as the process by which that text is given legal effect).76 In
the many instances in which the communicative content of the
constitutional text does not fully determine a legal result, these
originalists allow, a judge must engage in the “essentially normative” practice of construction.77 As a result of these and related
shifts, the so-called new originalism that predominates today is
conceptually sophisticated, richly elaborated, and substantially immune from the sharpest objections leveled against its
predecessors.
It is also highly impure, in the sense we use that term. As
Professor Thomas Colby has explained at length, the theoretical
adjustments that have enhanced originalism’s academic credibility and broadened its political appeal have “effectively sacrificed
the Old Originalism’s promise of judicial constraint.”78 The same
developments credited with helping originalism “work itself
pure”79 in a scholastic sense, that is, have compromised its foundational (and still often touted80) aim to limit judicial discretion
and bring clarity and predictability to constitutional law. A number of internal schisms have opened up along the way, as some
self-identified originalists seek to justify and facilitate its convergence with living constitutionalism,81 some seek to recast the theory
75 Antonin Scalia, Address by Justice Antonin Scalia before the Attorney General’s
Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in Original Meaning Jurisprudence: A Sourcebook 101, 106 (Office of Legal Policy 1987).
76 See Solum, 82 Fordham L Rev at 458–75 (cited in note 63) (explicating the
interpretation/construction distinction and its role in “the New Originalism”).
77 Id at 472. For a suggestion that the interpretation/construction distinction collapses, see Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Language?, 52 San Diego L Rev 501,
511–12 (2015).
78 Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 714 (cited in note 38). See also D.A. Jeremy Telman,
Originalism: A Thing Worth Doing . . ., 42 Ohio N U L Rev 529, 543 (2016) (“Originalism
now enacts judicial activism rather than resisting it.”).
79 Kesavan and Paulsen, 91 Georgetown L J at 1127, 1133 (cited in note 63). See also
Lee J. Strang, Originalism’s Promise, and Its Limits, 63 Cleve St L Rev 81, 84 (2014) (explaining that originalism has evolved to “meet[ ] the various criticisms that have been
leveled against it” and thereby made itself “better”).
80 See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U Pa J Const L 329, 330 (2013) (noting
that while “originalism has changed many times,” proponents continue to “tout[ ] its ability to constrain judges”).
81 See generally, for example, Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (Belknap 2011);
Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 Stan L Rev 551 (2006).
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in less normative and more positivistic terms,82 and some seek to
fend off the foregoing efforts—and save originalism’s “soul”83—
through additional methodological modifications84 or a return to
“[o]ld-time”85 ideas such as intentionalism.
Yet while Colby is correct that originalism has “sacrificed”
some of its original ideals as it has become increasingly refined,
he errs in assuming that this theoretical trajectory (or this tradeoff) is peculiar to originalism.86 On the contrary, the process of
adulteration through maturation is endemic to legal theorizing.
It is the life cycle. The failure to understand originalism’s development in this broader context, furthermore, distorts Colby’s
reading of the evidence that he so sensitively assembles—leading
him both to overstate the “inconsistency” and “incoherence” of the
originalist movement,87 and to understate the real-world effects
that its adulterated products may be having on the legal system.88
To make headway on the “bedeviling” phenomenon that Colby
has observed,89 it is necessary to generalize, and theorize, his
observations.

82 See generally, for example, William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 Colum
L Rev 2349 (2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 Harv
J L & Pub Pol 817 (2015).
83 Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in Huscroft and Miller, eds, The
Challenge of Originalism 223, 230 (cited in note 63).
84 See, for example, Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual
Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review 204–06 (Kansas 1999) (advocating deference to the political branches on matters of constitutional construction); John O. McGinnis
and Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation
and the Case against Construction, 103 Nw U L Rev 751, 752 (2009) (arguing that “the
Constitution should be interpreted based on the enactors’ original methods” of interpretation).
85 Smith, That Old-Time Originalism at 232 (cited in note 83).
86 See Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 714, 776 (cited in note 38) (describing originalism’s sacrifice of judicial constraint as an “unheralded,” “ironic,” and “bedeviling” phenomenon).
87 Colby and Smith, 59 Duke L J at 249 (cited in note 63). In Colby and his coauthor
Professor Peter Smith’s telling, originalism is “not a single, coherent, unified theory of
constitutional interpretation, but rather a smorgasbord of distinct constitutional theories
that share little in common except a misleading reliance on a single label.” Id at 244. Solum
has persuasively rebutted this claim and demonstrated that virtually all self-identified
originalists agree in principle on certain core ideas of “fixation” and “constraint.” See Solum,
82 Fordham L Rev at 459–62 (cited in note 63).
88 Colby provocatively ends his article with the suggestion that “[o]riginalism seems
to be having its cake and eating it too,” Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 778 (cited in note 38),
but he does not explore any specific consequences. For our own thoughts on the causes and
consequences of originalism’s adulterated persistence, see Part V.B.
89 Colby, 99 Georgetown L J at 776 (cited in note 38).
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B. From New Textualism to New New Textualism
When the theory of “new textualism” emerged in the 1980s,
it too promised to discipline judicial behavior—in the realm of
statutes.90 New textualism took aim at the broadly purposive approach to statutory interpretation that had come to dominate theory
and practice in the wake of the New Deal.91 Displacing an earlier
textualist tradition that sought to locate legislative intent in the
“plain meaning” of statutes,92 mid-century purposivists urged interpreters to “[c]arry [o]ut the [p]urpose” of statutes as best they
can, on the assumption “that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”93 The
distinguishing features of this purposive approach included the
extensive use of legislative history and a “soft plain meaning
rule,” according to which “the plainest meaning [could] be
trumped by contradictory legislative history.”94
By the 1980s, however, this approach had led courts into a
nettle of politically charged debates about the validity of new regulatory schemes.95 The judges’ “willingness to consider almost anything that was said about or happened to a legislative proposal
that becomes a statute” only highlighted the political stakes of
their interpretive methods.96 Drawing on modern public-choice

90 For a broad overview of the new textualist movement during the 1980s, see generally William N. Eskridge Jr, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621 (1990). See also
Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash U L Q
351, 355–57 (1994) (tracking the rise of textualism in the Supreme Court during the 1980s).
91 See Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 Va L Rev 451, 455 (2005)
(“[T]extualism arose as a challenge to a reigning ‘orthodoxy’ that dominated American
jurisprudence after World War II, and that encouraged judges to take a ‘purposivist’ approach to the interpretation of statutes.”) (citation omitted).
92 On the textualism that predominated during the pre–New Deal period, see Nicholas
R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary,
and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 Yale L J 266, 271–75, 302–06 (2013);
Harry Willmer Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 25 Wash U L Q 2, 5 (1939).
93 Henry M. Hart Jr and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 1378–80 (Foundation 1994) (William N. Eskridge Jr and
Philip P. Frickey, eds).
94 Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 626–28 (cited in note 90). On the normalization of
legislative history as an interpretive tool in the 1940s, see Parrillo, 123 Yale L J at 287–
300 (cited in note 92).
95 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability
Claims 1–11 (Yale 1983); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72
Cal L Rev 1044, 1048–81 (1984).
96 Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 632 (cited in note 90).
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scholarship as well as a classically formalist conception of the separation of powers, new textualists attacked the entire enterprise
of “imaginative[ly] reconstruct[ing]” legislative intent.97 Purposivism, they argued, underestimated the complexity and opacity of
the legislative process, overestimated the ability of judges to recover shared aims from biased committee reports and floor debates, and elevated judicial inclinations over the sovereign decisions embodied in legislative enactments.98 The most prominent
new textualists, such as Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook,
contended that these enactments—the statutory texts themselves—provided the sole legitimate source of law.99 “To favor a
statute’s purposes over its text, they argued, was to ignore the
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures and to aggrandize the judiciary’s role in the constitutional design.”100
It followed that exacting attention to a statute’s wording was
the sole acceptable method by which judges could determine what
the law required. Engagement with the relatively raw, valueladen language surrounding the passage of bills was both unnecessary and improper. By directing judges to focus on the semantic
structure of statutory texts rather than the policy debates surrounding their passage, new textualism thus proposed to rescue
the legitimacy of courts from the politically contentious chaos of
modern lawmaking. Consistent application of interpretive canons
to determine statutory meaning, moreover, would bring order to
that chaos by spurring Congress to engage in more careful legislative drafting.101

97

Id at 630–31.
See, for example, Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U Chi L Rev 533,
544–51 (1983); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987
Duke L J 371, 375–79.
99 See, for example, Immigration and Naturalization Service v Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
US 421, 452–53 (1987) (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (“Judges interpret laws rather
than reconstruct legislators’ intentions. Where the language of those laws is clear, we are
not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 Harv J L & Pub Pol 59, 60 (1988)
(“The words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters, are the ‘law.’”).
100 Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum L Rev 1, 27 (2006).
101 See Finley v United States, 490 US 545, 556 (1989) (Scalia) (“What is of paramount
importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive
rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.”).
98
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The theory of new textualism was suspected from the start of
being a political project aimed at restraining judicial and legislative efforts to create a more liberal administrative state.102 Although
these suspicions helped prompt a rapid scholarly response, critics
generally engaged new textualism on its own depoliticized and
proceduralist terms, focusing on the nuances of public choice and
constitutional design. Professors Daniel Farber and Philip
Frickey, for instance, argued that the public-choice analysis so
popular with new textualists was “compatible with a more respectful attitude toward legislative intent,”103 while their four corners approach to statutory interpretation belied their own commitment to being “honest agents of the political branches.”104 A
series of internal critiques soon followed. New textualists, it was
alleged, assumed without warrant that courts treat nonstatutory
legislative materials as sources of law rather than sources of evidence.105 New textualists undermined their own program by relying on a range of nonstatutory materials (from dictionaries to canons of construction to past precedents) to say what the law is;106
they also imputed intentions to Congress when deploying interpretive devices such as the absurdity doctrine.107 New textualists’
unprecedented refusal to consider legislative history actually aggrandized courts at the expense of Congress, given that legislators write laws against a backdrop of past judicial practice.108
102 See, for example, Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev 827, 834 (1991) (“Is this retreat to the
text merely a conservative plot to undermine liberal statutes?”); Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv L
Rev 892, 912 (1982) (arguing that textualist methodology supports an “implicit resurrection of laissez-faire individualism” that “undermines the legitimacy of congressional legislation”). See also Molot, 106 Colum L Rev at 25 (cited in note 100) (observing that the new
textualism could be seen as “one prong of a multipronged backlash against what was perceived to be a liberal and activist Warren Court era”).
103 Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
Va L Rev 423, 424 (1988).
104 Id at 459, quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv L Rev 4, 60 (1984).
105 See Mashaw, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev at 844 (cited in note 102).
106 See Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 674–76, 679–83 (cited in note 90); John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum L Rev 673, 702–05 (1997).
107 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of
Strict Statutory Construction, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 401, 422 (1994); William D. Popkin,
An “Internal” Critique of Justice Scalia’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 Minn L
Rev 1133, 1163 (1992).
108 See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am U L Rev
277, 306–07 (1990).
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New textualists quickly adapted to these critiques, and gave
up a good deal of ground in the process. As early as 1989, Scalia
acknowledged that various interpretive canons used by textualists required courts to engage in purposive analysis and to consider public policy.109 The legitimacy of these canons, he would
later explain, rests on a theory of implicit delegation of interpretive authority from Congress to the courts (or to agencies).110 By
1994, Easterbrook was prepared to concede that “‘[p]lain meaning’ as a way to understand language is silly”111 and to embrace
the importance of contextual evidence.112 Three years later, leading textualist theorist Professor John Manning proposed that
Scalia’s sweeping bicameralism-and-presentment argument
against legislative history be replaced with a much narrower
proposition: that nonstatutory materials such as committee reports could not authoritatively settle statutory meaning, as this
would imply an impermissible “self-delegation” of legislative authority from Congress to an entity under its control.113 Manning’s
argument not only was more esoteric than Scalia’s; it also contemplated and indeed championed recourse to legislative history
as a means to “add substantial value to the interpretive process
by supplying a well-informed, contemporaneous account of the
relevant background to the enactment.”114 Surveying the theory’s
development a decade after Manning wrote those words, Professor Jonathan Molot concluded that textualists “have been so
successful . . . [at] distinguishing their new brand of ‘modern textualism’ from the older, more extreme ‘plain meaning’ school, that
109 See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 Duke L J 511, 515 (discussing the canon of avoiding “absurd” results).
110 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 35
(Princeton 1997) (“Whatever Congress has not itself prescribed is left to be resolved by the
executive or (ultimately) the judicial branch.”).
111 Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
Harv J L & Pub Pol 61, 67 (1994).
112 Id at 64 (“Because interpretation is a social enterprise, because words have no
natural meanings, and because their effect lies in context, we must consult these contexts.”).
113 Manning, 97 Colum L Rev at 710–19 (cited in note 106).
114 Id at 732. See also John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 Cal L Rev
1287, 1289–90 (2010) (arguing that “[r]ather than focusing primarily on the broader question of whether to use legislative history generally, second-generation textualism emphasizes that judges in our system of government have a duty to enforce clearly worded statutes as written”). Manning has suggested an evolutionary narrative largely
complementary to our own, in which critics of “first-generation textualism” ultimately “improved, perhaps even saved, textualism by calling into question its early reliance on deeply
cynical arguments about the legislative process”—thus pushing textualists away from
public-choice theory and toward more palatable constitutional justifications. Id at 1289.
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they no longer can identify, let alone conquer, any remaining territory between textualism’s adherents and nonadherents.”115 New
textualism had worked itself impure.
Molot oversimplifies, however, in attributing this development to the new textualists’ quick and canny responses to criticisms (or graceful concessions of defeat).116 An additional impetus
to impurification came from the other side—from the efforts of the
theory’s critics to adapt it to their own normative ends. For even
as they rejected new textualism’s rigid conception of the separation of powers and its specific applications by judges like
Easterbrook and Scalia, left-leaning skeptics increasingly came to
view the theory as a useful corrective to purposivism’s own conservative tendencies. New textualism developed in parallel with
a literature challenging overly “archeological”117 or “static”118 approaches to statutory interpretation, which assumed that the
meaning of a statute was fixed at the time of its passage.119 On
both democratic and hermeneutic grounds, a range of liberal
scholars supported a more “dynamic” approach, and some of them
argued that new textualism, properly understood, did so as
well.120 Whatever its original political connotations, new textualism helpfully dispelled the fetishism of legislative intent and provided reasons to set aside legislative history, at least when such
history was contrary to interpretations that were textually plausible and socially preferable. The vitality of this connection between a liberal commitment to judicial-legislative dynamism and
a liberal openness to textualism (in highly adulterated form) can
be seen today in scholarship that identifies and endorses new

115

Molot, 106 Colum L Rev at 2 (cited in note 100).
See id at 34 (“Textualists have been able to win over new adherents and influence
nonadherents in large part because they have updated textualism and broadened its appeal.”).
117 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 Mich L Rev 20,
21 (1988).
118 Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 1994
S Ct Rev 429, 436–37.
119 For examples of works advocating a more dynamic approach, see generally Calabresi,
A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (cited in note 15); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire
(Belknap 1986); James Willard Hurst, Dealing with Statutes (Columbia 1982); William N.
Eskridge Jr, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U Pa L Rev 1479 (1987).
120 See, for example, Eskridge, 37 UCLA L Rev at 625 (cited in note 90) (“Notwithstanding reservations about the new textualism, I endorse its critique of the ‘archaeological’ rhetoric used by the Court.”); Mashaw, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev at 835–36 (cited in
note 102) (stating, “I am not at all convinced that we should so easily dismiss textualism,”
as “the exclusion of legislative history is more likely to increase the flexibility of statutes
than to render them static or rigid”).
116
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fields of federal common law, along with the proliferation of novel
interpretive canons.121
To be sure, one can still find “old” new textualists who, at
least some of the time, seek to maintain the purity of the theory’s
aversion to purposivism and intentionalism.122 But if the Roberts
Court’s recent jurisprudence is any indication, these efforts represent a rearguard action, and a highly adulterated new textualism reigns supreme. King v Burwell123 supplies a particularly significant example.124 In King, Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion
for the Court cites no legislative history in construing the Affordable
Care Act125 (ACA)—apparently basing its interpretation of an
“ambiguous” statutory provision on a reading of that provision in
the context of the statutory text as a whole and the application of
several traditional interpretive canons.126 As just described, the
Court’s approach sounds like a stringent form of textualism. Yet,
as Scalia emphasized in dissent, the degree to which the provision
was ambiguous was itself unclear.127 Roberts discerned from the
“long history of failed health insurance reform” leading up to the

121 See Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for
the Age of Statutes, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev 753, 806 (2013) (arguing that conceptualizing
interpretive canons as a form of “federal common law . . . could facilitate the kind of interpretive feedback loop between the Court and Congress that many have desired but some
have thought impossible”); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law,
80 Geo Wash L Rev 1293, 1351 (2012) (defending the legitimacy of administrative common
law on the ground that, “given its constitutional underpinnings,” it “bears a close resemblance to the use of constitutionally based canons of interpretation and clear statement
rules”).
122 See, for example, John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv L Rev 2387,
2393–2431 (2003) (criticizing the absurdity doctrine for overestimating judicial understanding of legislative purpose). Professor Jonathan Siegel has proposed that “textualism’s
fundamental axiom, combined with the tendency of the law to work itself pure,” inexorably
lead textualism “to make itself progressively more radical and, therefore, less workable.”
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U Pa L Rev 117,
120–22 (2009). We believe Siegel has things backward. In focusing on the logic of textualism’s internal “axioms,” Siegel misses all of the external dynamics that allow such axioms
to be reconceptualized or reformulated in response to criticism—and that prevent mainstream prescriptive legal theories, more generally, from tending toward radicalism.
123 135 S Ct 2480 (2015).
124 Professor Richard Re has identified several other cases that fit this mold in addition to King, including Yates v United States, 135 S Ct 1074 (2015), and Bond v United
States, 134 S Ct 2077 (2014). See Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 Green Bag 2d
407, 409–15 (2015).
125 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub L No 111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
126 King, 135 S Ct at 2491–96.
127 Id at 2501–03 (Scalia dissenting).
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ACA128 a “legislative plan” to expand access to coverage.129 In light
of this plan, the meaning of the disputed provision became ambiguous, as its most literal interpretation would result in the failure
to provide subsidies to millions of people legally obligated to purchase insurance.130 Roberts then resolved the ambiguity in a manner that was both permitted by the ACA’s text and accorded with
its goals.131
Distinguishing itself from the old purposivism, the Court’s
decision in King goes out of its way to establish that its interpretation “can fairly be read” from the statutory text.132 Yet the
Court’s “key move,” as Professor Richard Re observes, is to integrate purposive considerations into the threshold “identification
of textual clarity or ambiguity.”133 It has been suggested that the
remaining divide between textualists and nontextualists generally reduces to disagreements over whether a particular statutory
provision is or is not unambiguous.134 In its highly adulterated
form, however, new textualism encompasses both poles of this debate: just compare the majority and dissenting opinions in King.
As the King litigation further demonstrates, the original political
controversy that new textualism sought to resolve—about how
judges should respond to the growth of the administrative state—
is now being reprised within the terms of the theory.
C. From Popular Constitutionalism to Democratic
Constitutionalism
Compared to originalism and textualism, popular constitutionalism has passed through the stages of the life cycle at an accelerated pace. It burst on the intellectual scene and then was
quickly reworked. The story of popular constitutionalism’s impurification is also comparatively straightforward, in our view, so
we will tell it quickly.
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Id at 2485.
Id at 2496.
130 See King, 135 S Ct at 2490.
131 See id at 2494–95.
132 Id at 2496.
133 Re, 18 Green Bag 2d at 417 (cited in note 124). See also Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect
Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 Harv L Rev 62, 64 (2015) (observing that King’s references to “Congress’s
‘plan’” send “a strong message about Congress’s rationality and the inherent purposiveness and functionality of legislation”).
134 See Molot, 106 Colum L Rev at 45–46 (cited in note 100).
129

2016]

Working Themselves Impure

1855

Although its basic themes have been explored many times
since the Founding, the emergence of popular constitutionalism
as a distinctive contemporary theory is often pegged to the publication of works such as Professor Mark Tushnet’s book Taking the
Constitution Away from the Courts135 and Professor Larry Kramer’s
article We the Court136 around the turn of the millennium.137
Alarmed by the conservative “activism” of the Rehnquist Court
and the ethic of “judicial supremacy”138 that enabled it, Kramer
and Tushnet drew on history to argue for a relocation of authority
over constitutional interpretation and enforcement to “the people
themselves.” Both their rhetoric and their reform ideas were bracing. Americans should consider “doing away with judicial review.”139 When the Court becomes “overly assertive,” Congress
and the president should stand ready to “slash[ ]” its budget,
impeach its members, “strip it of jurisdiction,” and “ignore its
mandates.”140 The occasional rowdy mob might be useful too.141

135 See generally Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts
(Princeton 1999).
136 See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the
Court, 115 Harv L Rev 4 (2001). Kramer subsequently expanded his foreword into a book.
See generally Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and
Judicial Review (Oxford 2004).
137 See, for example, Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012
Wis L Rev 159, 160 n 1, 163 (describing Kramer’s and Tushnet’s writings as among “the
leading normative theories of popular constitutionalism” and Kramer as “popular constitutionalism’s ‘Founding Father’”). For a fuller list of scholars associated with the emergence of contemporary popular constitutionalism, see Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93
Georgetown L J 897, 897–99 (2005) (highlighting the contributions of Professor Richard
Parker in particular).
138 See, for example, Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts at 6–32
(cited in note 135) (criticizing “judicial supremacy”); Kramer, 115 Harv L Rev at 128–69
(cited in note 136) (condemning the Rehnquist Court’s “[a]ssault on [p]opular [c]onstitutionalism,” and its “philosophy of judicial sovereignty”); Larry D. Kramer, No Surprise. It’s
an Activist Court. (NY Times, Dec 12, 2000), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/12/
opinion/no-surprise-it-s-an-activist-court.html (visited Sept 27, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) (“[C]onservative judicial activism is the order of the day. The Warren Court was
retiring compared to the present one.”). “Popular constitutionalists reserve[d] their fiercest criticism for the Rehnquist Court’s ‘Section Five’ decisions,” such as City of Boerne v
Flores, 521 US 507 (1997), which limited Congress’s power to regulate discrimination under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement by Proxy,
95 Va L Rev 1663, 1725 (2009).
139 Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts at 154 (cited in note 135).
140 Kramer, The People Themselves at 249 (cited in note 136).
141 See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum
L Rev 2047, 2062 (2010) (noting that “Kramer repeatedly and sympathetically refers to
[mobbing] in The People Themselves”).
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Leading popular constitutionalists such as Kramer and Tushnet
did not specify any single decision procedure—they differed in
this regard from their counterparts in the originalism, textualism, and CBA movements—but their prescriptions likewise concentrated on the manner in which legal questions are resolved, in
view of an overriding high-level goal (here, popular sovereignty).
Critics on the political left as well as the right quickly
mounted a range of objections. Popular constitutionalism, many
worried, would debilitate judicial authority and jeopardize minority rights142 and individual rights.143 Its judgments rested on
overly pessimistic premises about the aloofness of the Court144 and
overly optimistic premises about the capacities and interests of ordinary citizens.145 Ironically, popular constitutionalism would prove
unpopular in practice, given the American public’s long-standing

142

See, for example, Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of
Popular Constitutionalism, 2004 U Ill L Rev 673, 690 (“Popular constitutionalism’s central
flaw is its failure to recognize that the protection of minorities and their rights cannot rely
on the majority.”). See also Donnelly, 2012 Wis L Rev at 166 & n 24 (cited in note 137)
(collecting sources arguing that “Kramer’s brand of popular constitutionalism” is “too radical” and will “result in majoritarian tyranny”).
143 See, for example, Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of
Ideas, 61 Vand L Rev 1067, 1071 (2008) (criticizing popular constitutionalism for failing
to see “that judicial review, robustly practiced, is an indispensable mechanism for protecting the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution”).
144 See, for example, Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 Mich
L Rev 2596, 2598–99 (2003) (arguing that “there is substantial congruity between popular
opinion and the decisions of constitutional judges,” which “suggests that popular constitutionalists may be getting what they want” indirectly).
145 See, for example, Neal Devins, Book Review, The D’oh! of Popular Constitutionalism, 105 Mich L Rev 1333, 1335 (2007) (“[T]he people are uninterested in the Constitution
and the Supreme Court.”); Gewirtzman, 93 Georgetown L J at 899 (cited in note 137) (criticizing popular constitutionalism for romanticizing “the People” and ignoring evidence
that “participation and interest in politics are declining” and “popular interpretive opinions are often based on limited information, and are highly susceptible to manipulation by
elites”). See also Richard A. Posner, Book Review, The People’s Court, New Republic 32,
35 (July 19, 2004) (“The very concept [of popular constitutionalism] is barely intelligible.
. . . There is no federal town meeting at which 200 million adult Americans could deliberate and then take a vote.”).
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support for judicial supremacy.146 If the theory somehow were to
take hold, might it not lead to anarchy?147
Scholarship identified with popular constitutionalism began
to splinter. One strain sought to deepen the case against judicial
review.148 A much larger and more conciliatory strain, however,
attempted to parry the first wave of objections by softening popular constitutionalism’s conception of the “popular.” Kramer himself led the way. Responding to his critics, Kramer explained in
2006 that he was not calling for “direct action” or the abolition of
judicial review, but rather for richer constitutional deliberation
and the “mediation” of popular will “through formal institutions
of government.”149 While devices such as “ignoring mandates,
budget cutting, jurisdiction stripping, court packing, and the like”
may be preferable to “nothing,” Kramer suggested, there are
many subtler ways of exerting political pressure on the courts and
thereby ensuring popular control over constitutional law.150
As Tom Donnelly has noted, “[i]t is unclear whether this
[was] simply a clarification of [Kramer’s] original intended position, a reevaluation based on thoughtful criticisms, or something
in between.”151 Regardless, the message was clear that popular
constitutionalism does not necessarily require populism in any
146 See, for example, Larry Alexander and Lawrence B. Solum, Book Review, Popular?
Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv L Rev 1594, 1637 (2005) (“[T]he idea that the judicial branch
should act as the final and authoritative interpreter of the Constitution has been a profoundly popular one.”); Greene, Book Review, 117 Yale L J at 919 (cited in note 39) (submitting that constitutional theorists “who would make [the case against judicial review]
must confront the possibility that the people have spoken and that [the theorists] just do
not like the answer”).
147 See, for example, Alexander and Solum, Book Review, 118 Harv L Rev at 1611,
1613 (cited in note 146) (contending that certain versions of popular constitutionalism
could lead to “naked power struggles” or “anarchy”).
148 See generally, for example, Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial
Review, 115 Yale L J 1346 (2006). In discussing the prior literature, Professor Jeremy
Waldron lumps together Kramer’s and Tushnet’s books as especially pertinent works “attacking judicial review in America.” Id at 1350.
149 Larry Kramer, Response, 81 Chi Kent L Rev 1173, 1175 (2006). See also Larry D.
Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism, and the
Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 Valp U L Rev 697, 749 (2006) (advocating a “restrained” system of Madisonian “departmentalism,” which “works only if there is enforced
discipline within the respective branches”).
150 Kramer, 41 Valp U L Rev at 749 (cited in note 149).
151 Donnelly, 2012 Wis L Rev at 168 (cited in note 137). See also Knowles and Toia,
42 S U L Rev at 43 (cited in note 57) (“Since the publication of The People Themselves,
Kramer has not helped the definitional cause of ‘popular constitutionalism.’ He has continued to move away from the language of his foreword which lobbied for ‘an ever-shrinking
role for the Court.’”).
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recognizable form; rather, it can and should be effectuated
through democratically accountable institutions. Sympathetic
scholars increasingly began to migrate away from Kramer’s terminology in favor of the more decorous label of “democratic constitutionalism” proposed by Professors Robert Post and Reva
Siegel.152 Foreshadowing this shift, Kramer slipped without explanation from “popular constitutionalism” to “democratic constitutionalism” in the penultimate sentence of a 2006 response
piece.153
Once the key adulterating move to “mediating” structures
was made, it turned out that popular constitutionalism was everywhere. Scholars began to locate the practice of, or potential for,
popular constitutionalism in an ever-growing list of institutions,
from the federal Congress154 and executive branch,155 to state judicial elections156 and attorneys general,157 to the lower federal
courts.158 Even the Supreme Court could be recast as an agent rather than an enemy of popular constitutionalism, given the empirical evidence showing that its opinions tend to stay within the

152 Robert Post and Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv CR–CL L Rev 373, 374 (2007).
153 Kramer, 81 Chi Kent L Rev at 1182 (cited in note 149). Although its populist credentials are disputed by some, the Tea Party movement’s subsequent emergence seems to
have pushed liberal scholars still further away from “pure” versions of popular constitutionalism. See, for example, Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive
the Tea Party Movement?, 105 Nw U L Rev 1807, 1808–10 (2011) (arguing that the Tea
Party movement’s “militantly nationalist” constitutional vision “calls into question” the
idea that popular constitutionalism advances “democratic values”); Christopher W.
Schmidt, Popular Constitutionalism on the Right: Lessons from the Tea Party, 88 Denver
U L Rev 523, 525–26 (2011) (suggesting that the Tea Party challenges the “underlying
assumption behind much of the scholarship on popular constitutionalism” that popular
claims on the Constitution will tend to promote liberal causes).
154 See generally, for example, Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 112 Yale L J 1943 (2003). See also Donnelly, 2012 Wis L Rev at 177–86 (cited
in note 137).
155 See generally Jedediah Purdy, Presidential Popular Constitutionalism, 77 Fordham
L Rev 1837 (2009).
156 See Pozen, 110 Colum L Rev at 2064–86 (cited in note 141); David E. Pozen, What
Happened in Iowa?, 111 Colum L Rev Sidebar 90, 91–93 (2011).
157 See generally Joseph Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys
General, 122 Harv L Rev F 108 (2011).
158 See generally Ori Aronson, Inferiorizing Judicial Review: Popular Constitutionalism in Trial Courts, 43 U Mich J L Ref 971 (2010); Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 123 Yale L J Online 197 (2013).
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mainstream of public opinion.159 Indeed, even Supreme Court decisions striking down progressive federal laws for exceeding the
scope of Congress’s enumerated powers—the very paradigm of judicial activism that stirred Kramer to such righteous anger—
might be recast as victories for popular constitutionalism, given
their arguable benefits to democratic deliberation.160
Popular constitutionalism has thus crossed the political aisle
and become increasingly self-contradictory. The theory has not
simply failed to dispel controversy over the Court’s constitutional
jurisprudence or to make any appreciable dent in judicial supremacy. It has given proponents of robust judicial review a new language of legitimation—just like originalism.
D. From Quantitative CBA to “Qualitative” CBA
While CBA is an expansive term with a long intellectual and
political history,161 CBA as a prescriptive theory of public law
emerged as a distinct discourse in the legal academy in the 1980s.
It did so in response to the growth of CBA in judicial review of

159 See Friedman, 101 Mich L Rev at 2596–2613 (cited in note 144) (developing this
argument at length). See also generally, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv L Rev 191 (2008) (analyzing
the Court’s originalist decision in District of Columbia v Heller, 554 US 570 (2008), as the
product of popular constitutionalism).
160 See, for example, Roderick M. Hills Jr, The Individual Right to Federalism in the
Rehnquist Court, 74 Geo Wash L Rev 888, 903 (2006) (“[T]he Rehnquist Court’s restriction
of Congress’s power to redefine Fourteenth Amendment liberty . . . is not suppression of
popular constitutionalism: it is judicial promotion of popular constitutionalism because
these decisions protect nonfederal debate from the jurispathic tendencies of federal legislation to curtail such debate.”). Some scholars on the left, meanwhile, began to argue that
mechanisms of direct democracy such as constitutional ballot initiatives do not count as
popular constitutionalism. See, for example, Raphael Rajendra, “The People” and “The
People”: Disaggregating Citizen Lawmaking from Popular Constitutionalism, 27 L & Inequality 53, 84–91 (2009). See also Pozen, 110 Colum L Rev at 2122 n 296 (cited in note 141)
(questioning “whether the vocabulary of ‘popular constitutionalism’ has ceased to advance
comprehension”).
161 CBA developed out of early twentieth-century welfare economics and has played
an intermittent role in administrative decisionmaking since the New Deal. See Adler and
Posner, 109 Yale L J at 169–72 (cited in note 42) (discussing welfare economics as the
theoretical origin of CBA and the early use of CBA in New Deal flood-control projects). But
CBA first achieved sustained attention in the legal academy via the law and economics
movement, which focused initially on private law. See, for example, Kennedy, 33 Stan L
Rev at 387 (cited in note 34) (describing law and economics in 1981 as “the body of literature and taught tradition that proposes and elaborates cost-benefit analysis as a way for
a policy maker to decide what private law rules to recommend to judges, legislators or
administrators”).
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administrative action162 and, more significantly, the increasing
use of CBA by administrators themselves.163 The latter trend
reached its initial, controversial culmination in the Reagan administration’s 1981 executive order directing agencies to implement regulations only when “the potential benefits to society . . .
outweigh the potential costs.”164 This requirement marked a decisive intervention in the long-running—and, by 1981, increasingly
politically contentious—debate over the efficacy and legitimacy of
the administrative state.165
Most participants in this debate agreed that the administrative state was beset by “regulatory failure,” but their diagnoses
and proposed solutions differed sharply.166 Some argued that the
central problem was capture of agencies by regulated industries
and the consequent harm to regulatory beneficiaries.167 Others argued that the key problem was agencies’ heedless advocacy on behalf
of putative beneficiaries, at the expense of regulated industries

162 See, for example, Industrial Union Department, AFL–CIO v American Petroleum
Institute, 448 US 607, 644–45 (1980) (finding that the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration failed to perform adequate CBA when regulating benzene levels in the
workplace); Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 348–49 (1976) (employing a form of CBA to
resolve a welfare recipient’s procedural due process claim). See also Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U Chi L Rev 28, 48 (1976) (criticizing “the
utilitarian balancing analysis” used by the Court in cases such as Mathews).
163 See Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 167, 170–71 (cited in note 42) (describing
the reemergence and routinization of CBA in government agencies in the 1980s). See also
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43
J Legal Stud S351, S355–58 (2014) (tracing the origins of public law CBA to the movement
of “health-and-safety regulation [ ] from the decentralized tort system to the centralized
administrative system of the modern regulatory state” during the 1970s and 1980s).
164 Executive Order 12291 § 2(b) (1981), 3 CFR 127, 128.
165 See Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62
U Chi L Rev 1, 3–6 (1995) (discussing the controversy engendered by Executive Order 12291 and a follow-on order); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 Ariz L Rev 1267, 1268 (1981) (“Although there are historical antecedents
for [Executive Order 12291], no other President has gone nearly so far. In particular, no
other President has provided that regulatory action may not be initiated unless the benefits exceed the costs.”) (citation omitted). On the politics of administrative governance in
the preceding decades, see generally Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945–1970, 53 Vand L
Rev 1389 (2000).
166 Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1269 (cited in note 165) (reviewing this debate).
167 See, for example, George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J
Econ & Mgmt Sci 3 (1971) (suggesting a causal link between regulated party pressure and
administrative outcomes). See also Joanna L. Grisinger, The Unwieldy American State:
Administrative Politics since the New Deal 195–250 (Cambridge 2012) (discussing the origins of capture theory).
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and the economic welfare of the nation as a whole.168 A third camp
suggested that forces of bureaucratic entrenchment and selfaggrandizement were leading agencies further and further away
from their statutorily imposed missions.169
The Reagan administration’s CBA policy was seen to take
sides in this dispute. As Professor Cass Sunstein noted shortly
after the publication of the executive order, its implicit diagnosis
of regulatory failure was that “regulation has been unduly intrusive on the private sector.”170 The administration’s solution, moreover, was undergirded by a particular “normative conception” of
the administrative state: namely, that “the purpose of regulation—at least as a general rule—is to promote economic ‘efficiency,’ or to increase production, by compensating for free rider
effects and transactions cost barriers to bargaining.”171 The executive order did not define “costs” and “benefits” in explicitly economic terms. Yet, as Sunstein concluded, “the language of the order, as well as the rhetoric used during its implementation,
indicate[d] that it [was] intended to ensure that regulatory decisions will promote economic ‘efficiency.’” 172
Interpreted in this way, as imposing a “wealth maximization”
requirement on the administrative state,173 the 1981 order instantiated a potentially inflammatory prescriptive theory of public
law. It ignored the leading alternative accounts of regulatory failure: capture and self-aggrandizement. And it appeared to endorse
a rigidly welfarist version of CBA, one that economists and lawyers
had spent more than a decade attacking for its theoretical refusal
or practical inability to accommodate distributional concerns and
other “soft” variables.174 Nonetheless, Sunstein offered a qualified
168 See generally, for example, Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose:
A Personal Statement (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1979).
169 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J
Legal Stud 305, 305–12 (1972).
170 Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1270 (cited in note 165).
171 Id.
172 Id at 1277.
173 Id at 1272.
174 Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think about Plastic Trees: New Foundations for
Environmental Law, 83 Yale L J 1315, 1318–19 (1974). See also I.M.D. Little, A Critique
of Welfare Economics 95 (Oxford 2d ed 1957) (proposing a distributional constraint on the
standard Kaldor-Hicks efficiency analysis); Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 170–71
(cited in note 42) (describing midcentury critiques of welfarism by theoretical economists,
as well as the practical obstacles to “obtaining relevant data, especially for the purpose of
valuing environmental resources, human life, and other hard-to-measure goods,” that both
applied economists and government officials came to acknowledge during the 1970s); Laurence
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defense of the executive order’s implicit theory, insisting that “the
conception of the regulatory process reflected in the order is peculiarly well-suited to the institutional competence of the executive
branch.”175 Nor was Sunstein alone among progressive legal theorists in supporting the Reagan administration’s initiative. As Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman summarized the state of affairs in
the early 1980s:
At the level of broad substantive principle there was agreement between the Reagan administration and Progressivism
on the need for regulatory reform. Both believed that government intervention in the economy should be justified by reference to market failures and that, insofar as possible, costbenefit tests should be used to set regulatory policy.176
Of course, progressives were not blind to the deregulatory potential of CBA. Sunstein’s support was premised on the argument
that the Reagan administration’s order contained an internal
mechanism for taming the excesses of CBA, in its proviso that
CBA be used “to the extent permitted by law.”177 What this meant,
according to Sunstein, was that the CBA directive applied only to
a subset of statutes: those whose efficiency-promoting implementation would not frustrate legislative purposes and thus compromise the separation of powers.178 Given that “the questions faced
by Congress . . . are predominantly distributional,” Sunstein reasoned, many statutes would not be subject to efficiency maximization.179 Other statutes, however, appear to seek efficiency—for
example, certain antitrust laws and laws “protecting against an
‘unreasonable risk’ to health or safety”—and so would fit comfortably with the logic of CBA.180 Still other statutes, including many
antipollution laws, “have some effects which maximize wealth,
H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 Phil & Pub Aff 66, 71, 78–106 (1972)
(discussing theoretical and practical objections to CBA “[e]ither in its original form or as
supplemented by a distributional constraint”).
175 Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1270 (cited in note 165).
176 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Defending the State: A Skeptical Look at “Regulatory Reform” in the Eighties, 61 U Colo L Rev 517, 518 (1990). For a similar, if notably less cheerful, reconciliation of progressive goals with interest balancing in the administrative due
process context, see generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest
for a Dignitary Theory, 61 BU L Rev 885 (1981).
177 Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1273 (cited in note 165), quoting Executive Order 12291
§ 2, 3 CFR at 128.
178 Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1273 (cited in note 165).
179 Id at 1274.
180 Id at 1274–75.
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and some that do not.”181 In these cases, an agency could choose
to enforce “only the efficiency-promoting applications” of the law,
so long as this “exclusive implementation [did] not fundamentally
conflict with legislative purposes.”182 In addition, CBA could be
used by agencies to select the most “cost-effective approaches”
to implementation that vindicated Congress’s non-efficiencymaximizing aims, to “identify the costs and benefits of regulatory
proposals with a view to statutory reform or ordering priorities,”
and to “decline to act in exceptional cases of de minimis benefits
and high costs.”183
By imposing a separation-of-powers decision procedure on top
of CBA’s own decision procedure, Sunstein effectively delegated
the task of resolving many of the traditional critiques of CBA to
an idealized model of administrative decisionmaking. For instance, the complaint that CBA fails to consider distributional or
deontological values became something of a non sequitur in
Sunstein’s scheme. It was simply against the law for administrators to use CBA to implement statutes with solely distributional
goals, or to implement a statute’s efficiency-promoting provisions
in a manner that “fundamentally conflict[s]” with the statute’s
other, non-efficiency-promoting purposes.184
Over the course of the 1980s, actual administrative practice
would frustrate this idealized model. An “atmosphere of scandal”
thickened around the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
in particular, as rumors swirled that the president’s Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)—responsible for oversight of
the CBA initiative—had “illegally delayed EPA promulgation of
regulations” and “subverted statutory standards.”185 Mass resignations followed in 1983, and the new administrator, brought in
to restore public confidence, fared little better. His “plan to propose a modest acid rain control program was vetoed after OMB
Director David Stockman” determined “that it would cost several
thousand dollars per pound of fish saved.”186

181

Id at 1275.
Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1279–80 (cited in note 165).
183 Id at 1279.
184 Id at 1275, 1279–80.
185 Robert V. Percival, Checks without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, 54 L & Contemp Probs 127, 152 (Autumn 1991).
186 Id.
182
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Against this political backdrop, academic criticism of public
law CBA intensified. Scholars issued new challenges to CBA’s elevation of economic efficiency to the status of a legal norm. No
defensible theory of regulation, many argued, could justify the
categorical privileging of efficiency over other public values or individual preferences.187 CBA’s exaltation of efficiency would lead,
instead, to a “lack of balance.”188 The Reagan administration’s
CBA program, for example, allegedly “focused almost exclusively
on reducing costs to industry.”189 Critics also questioned the ability of CBA to accurately price goods “not normally bought and sold
on markets”—the sorts of goods that regulators so often have to
take into account.190
By the 1990s, these criticisms (and the experience of two Republican presidencies) had chastened those politically progressive
legal theorists who had been initially supportive of the Reagan
administration’s CBA initiative.191 When the Clinton administration

187 See, for example, Richard S. Markovits, Duncan’s Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis
and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 36 Stan L Rev 1169, 1169 (1984) (“Many
observers have become concerned about th[e] growing importance of cost-benefit analysis.
. . . They argue [ ] that in practice cost-benefit analysts tend to . . . use this technique to
mask the real value choices that underlie judicial, administrative, or legislative decisions.”); Mark Sagoff, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us or Conflict and Contradiction
in Environmental Law, 12 Envir L 283, 292 (1982) (“[Cost-benefit] analysis leads, inevitably, to the question: Why efficiency? . . . Why should we assume beforehand that an efficient society is better than a less efficient one?”).
188 Percival, 54 L & Contemp Probs at 186 (cited in note 185).
189 Id.
190 Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 Reg 33, 36 (Jan/Feb
1981). See also Peter L. Strauss, Regulatory Reform in a Time of Transition, 15 Suffolk U
L Rev 903, 930 (1981) (“As long as our responses [to questions of life and death] remain
irrational the notion that cost-benefit analysis can produce clear answers to regulatory
issues remains irrational along with them.”); Rachel Bayefsky, Note, Dignity as a Value
in Agency Cost-Benefit Analysis, 123 Yale L J 1732, 1738 n 12 (2014) (collecting critical
writings from the 1990s and 2000s on CBA’s “pricing the priceless” and “incommensurability problem[s]”). In light of these practical challenges, some scholars proposed confining
the use of CBA to a limited set of policy domains. See, for example, Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv L Rev 393, 431–32 (1981) (arguing
that CBA is most appropriate in “relatively stable” policymaking environments, generally
those in which a regulatory regime has reached a mature state after a long period of “incrementalism”). See also Thomas O. McGarity, Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureaucracy 174–75 (Cambridge 1991) (concluding that
CBA’s ideal of “comprehensive analytical rationality” is attainable “only for the most important rules”).
191 See, for example, Rose-Ackerman, 61 U Colo L Rev at 518 (cited in note 176)
(“Some of the fundamental positions of the past administration suggested that genuine
reform might occur. Unfortunately, most have proved to be little more than simplistic
slogans.”).
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introduced its own “Regulatory Planning and Review” executive
order in 1993,192 Sunstein and his coauthor Professor Richard Pildes
characterized it as a “quite surprising step.”193 President Bill
Clinton’s order had retained the Reagan-era “emphasis on costbenefit analysis as the basic foundation of decision,” they observed, but it also “include[d] a new, complex, and somewhat unruly set of substantive principles,” some of which “qualif[ied] the
commitment to cost-benefit analysis, though in ambiguous ways,”
and some of which were “of uncertain legality.”194 In response to
this continuation and complication of Reagan-era CBA policy, Pildes
and Sunstein offered “a range of proposals designed” to “simultaneously promot[e] economic and democratic goals.”195 These proposals amounted to a significant impurification of the theory of
efficiency-maximizing CBA that Sunstein had defended fourteen
years earlier. “Regulations should be evaluated not only in terms
of aggregate costs and benefits,” Pildes and Sunstein wrote, “but
also in terms that reflect democratic judgments about qualitative
differences among qualitatively different risks”—including “an
understanding of whether a risk is voluntarily incurred, especially dreaded, equitably distributed, potentially irreversible or
catastrophic, faced by future generations, or incurred by discrete
groups within the population.”196
No longer could formalistic separation-of-powers principles
be relied upon to prevent CBA from suppressing values sounding
in distribution, desert, and the like. Indeed, Pildes and Sunstein’s
rejection of a “single metric” of analysis and their call for a “disaggregated system for assessing the qualitatively different effects of
regulatory impositions”197 strayed so far from traditional, efficiencymaximizing CBA that Professors Matthew Adler and Eric Posner
argued the approach could not be properly characterized as CBA

192

See generally Executive Order 12866 (1993), 3 CFR 638.
Pildes and Sunstein, 62 U Chi L Rev at 6 (cited in note 165).
194 Id at 6–7.
195 Id at 8.
196 Id at 9 (emphases added). To implement these ideas, Pildes and Sunstein suggested that the executive branch experiment with approaches such as “a two-stage analytic process” that introduces qualitative considerations after “conventional cost-benefit
balancing” and “different forms of citizen participation” that “build into the regulatory
process an understanding of informed public judgments about how different risks should
be treated.” Id at 9–10.
197 Pildes and Sunstein, 62 U Chi L Rev at 65 (cited in note 165).
193
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at all.198 Pildes and Sunstein’s approach resembled, rather, the
sort of “procedure that agencies regularly seem to employ in lieu
of CBA.”199
Adler and Posner sought to ward off such impurification.
Writing in 1999, they explained that the deontological, distributional, “desert-based,” and “perfectionist” issues (“such as the purported intrinsic good of preserving endangered species”) that troubled Pildes and Sunstein were “nonwelfarist considerations”—and
“CBA does not capture, and is not meant to capture, nonwelfarist
considerations.”200 The political controversy and normative anxiety that welfarist CBA had provoked, in Adler and Posner’s telling, stemmed from a failure to appreciate that “CBA is a decision
procedure, not a moral standard.”201 Adler and Posner allowed that
CBA need not be “the exclusive choice procedure for government,”
and could be employed “as one part of the overall set of procedures
and institutions by which projects are ultimately approved, rejected, or amended.”202 But they insisted that CBA retain its pure,
welfarist form, as only in that form can it reliably “enabl[e] agencies to evaluate projects according to the extent that they contribute to overall well-being.”203
But such is not the fate of process-oriented public law theories. Three decades after Sunstein penned his formalistic defense
of the Reagan administration’s imposition of efficiency-maximizing
CBA on the executive branch, the Obama administration issued
an order on “Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review.”204 By
this time, Sunstein was serving as administrator of the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, and Executive Order 13563
reflected the adulterated conception of CBA that Pildes and he had
proposed in the wake of the backlash to Reagan-era CBA. The order directs agencies to “select, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, those approaches that maximize net benefits
198

Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 234 (cited in note 42). See also Richard O. Zerbe
Jr and Allen S. Bellas, A Primer for Benefit–Cost Analysis 14–15 (Edward Elgar 2006)
(describing wealth maximization under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion as “the mainstream
view” of CBA, but noting the emergence of an alternative view that “includ[es] equity goods
and those represented by moral sentiments”).
199 Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 234 (cited in note 42) (emphasis added).
200 Id at 245. “The objection that CBA fails to capture” nonwelfarist considerations,
Adler and Posner continued, “is really no objection at all.” Id.
201 Id at 167.
202 Id at 245.
203 Adler and Posner, 109 Yale L J at 245 (cited in note 42).
204 See generally Executive Order 13563 (2011), 3 CFR 215.
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(including potential economic, environmental, public health and
safety, and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity).”205 “Where appropriate and permitted by law,” the opening
section continues, “each agency may consider (and discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.”206
The references to “fairness” and “human dignity” were new to this
line of executive orders,207 and their inclusion led some conservative commentators to ask sarcastically whether “a rule might pass
Mr. Obama’s cost-benefit test if it imposes $999 billion in hard
costs but supposedly results in a $1 trillion increase in human
dignity.”208 In practice, President Barack Obama has suggested
that these “soft” variables have done little to disturb traditional,
quantitative modes of analysis.209 In the law on the books as in
the academic literature, however, such variables have become increasingly integrated into the methodology of CBA.210
205

Executive Order 13563 § 1(b)(1), 3 CFR at 215.
Executive Order 13563 § 1(c), 3 CFR at 216. These provisions implement the “nonsectarian” understanding of CBA that Sunstein began to articulate in the 2000s. See Robert
W. Hahn and Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation?
Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U Pa L Rev 1489, 1498 (2002) (describing
CBA’s core, and perhaps only, requirement as “a full accounting of the consequences of an
action, in both quantitative and qualitative terms”).
207 Bayefsky, Note, 123 Yale L J at 1735 & n 3 (cited in note 190).
208 Id at 1735–36, quoting Editorial, Obama’s Rule-Making Loophole (Wall St J, Jan
24, 2011), online at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704881304576094132
896862582 (visited Sept 29, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable). Rachel Bayefsky defends
the inclusion of dignity and urges agencies to adopt a “qualitative specificity” model of
CBA, pursuant to which regulators would aim to “clarify, in qualitative terms, the nature
and gravity of the dignitary values at stake in a particular regulatory context.” Bayefsky,
Note, 123 Yale L J at 1737 (cited in note 190).
209 See Remarks by the President to the Business Roundtable (White House Office of
the Press Secretary, Sept 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/MK3X-3H3L (“[W]e don’t
issue a regulation where the costs are not lower than the benefits. And if you look at the
regulations we’ve generally put forward, the costs are substantially lower than the benefits that are generated.”). But see Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Unquantified
Benefits and the Problem of Regulation under Uncertainty, 102 Cornell L Rev 87, 136
(2016) (finding that “[a]gencies regularly promulgate regulations for which they do not
fully quantify costs and benefits” and that “[i]n many cases, these regulations [have] involved significant, measurable costs in excess of $100 million and no quantified benefits”).
210 There now exists a highly sophisticated literature, to which Sunstein has contributed, about how noneconomic values may be reconciled with CBA. See, for example, Eyal
Zamir and Barak Medina, Law, Economics, and Morality 3 (Oxford 2010) (describing the
book’s project as examining “the possibility of combining economic methodology and deontological morality through explicit and direct incorporation of moral constraints (and options) into economic CBA”); Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 Cal L Rev
1369, 1380–85 (2014) (discussing Executive Order 13563 and suggesting various regulatory strategies for dealing with “nonquantifiable” values).
206
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By the lights of Adler and Posner, this is no longer CBA. It
certainly is not the version of CBA that Sunstein endorsed in 1981
as “peculiarly well-suited to the institutional competence of the
executive branch.”211 As reflected in the governing executive orders and in Sunstein’s own writings, mainstream CBA has now
internalized the very same “impossible to quantify”212 values of
distribution, fairness, and dignity that hounded the administrative state throughout the 1970s and that the Reagan-era proponents of CBA had hoped to transcend.
IV. ANALOGUES TO THE LIFE CYCLE THEORY
The claim that prescriptive legal theories such as the ones
just discussed tend to become impurified has numerous analogues, both in academic research and in the real-world operation
of law and politics. Before we examine the implications of our
claim for legal practice, this Part briefly examines parallels to the
life cycle model elsewhere in law, political science, and the philosophy of science. Investigating these parallels helps to place our
model in a larger conceptual context and further establish its
plausibility. A comparison with the work of Professor Thomas
Kuhn, in particular, helps to illuminate ways in which the progress of “legal science” does and does not resemble other fields of
scientific endeavor.
A. Analogues in Law
1. Rules/standards convergence.
Legal theorists in general, and constitutional theorists in
particular, have posited life cycle–like processes before. On the
jurisprudential side, scholars such as Professors Pierre Schlag
and Frederick Schauer have argued that the putatively fundamental distinction between legal rules and legal standards turns
out to be unstable over time, as rules tend “to evolve or degenerate,
depending upon our perspective, into standards, and standards to
evolve or degenerate into rules.”213 Rules are designed to be precise,

211

Sunstein, 23 Ariz L Rev at 1270 (cited in note 165).
Executive Order 13563 § 1(c), 3 CFR at 216.
213 Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L Rev 379, 429 (1985). In a less
nominalist and more empirical vein than Schlag, Schauer likewise suggests a general tendency for rules and standards to converge. See Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of
212
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offering clear ex ante guidance to interested parties. Standards
are designed to be imprecise, leaving much of their content to be
worked out on a case-by-case basis pursuant to an overarching
principle or policy.214 And yet, in practice, these regulatory strategies gradually bleed into one another, as rules become riddled
with qualifications and exceptions that reduce their clarity and
standards become concretized through interpretations and understandings that reduce their flexibility.
The literature on rules/standards convergence relates to our
own theory in at least two noteworthy ways. First, this literature
sheds some light on the drivers of the life cycle. According to
Schauer, whenever legal decisionmakers can “permissibly or legitimately or professionally” exercise discretion—and they usually can—they will be tempted to deploy “rule-avoiding strategies” to prevent the seemingly unjust or unreasonable application
of a given rule to a given case.215 At the same time, many decisionmakers will be tempted to rein in the “uncomfortable vagueness”216 of standards through “rulification” techniques: “More
choice is not always better than less, and not every decisionmaker has the time, energy, or inclination to engage in the ‘from
the ground up’ process that unconstrained discretion and unspecified standards require.”217 The upshot of these paired processes
of “adaptive behaviour”218 is the de facto merger of rules and
standards.
Rules and Standards, 2003 NZ L Rev 303, 311–21. See also Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J Contemp Legal Issues 803, 806
(2005) (arguing that “the rulification of standards is as common a phenomenon as is the
standardization of rules”). Scholars have also identified a pendulum swing between rules
and standards in a variety of specific fields of law. See, for example, Aziz Z. Huq and Jon
D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers Jurisprudence, 126 Yale L J 346, 349
(2016) (describing the Supreme Court’s “oscillat[ions] between using rules and using standards”
in separation-of-powers cases); Jason Scott Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts
Process: An Economic Analysis of Legal Form, 76 Cornell L Rev 341, 346 (1991) (describing
“a pattern of ceaseless oscillation, from rules to balancing and back again,” in tort law);
Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 Stan L Rev 577, 580 (1988) (describing “the blurring of clear and distinct property rules with the muddy doctrines of ‘maybe
or maybe not,’ and [ ] the reverse tendency to try to clear up the blur with new crystalline
rules”).
214 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen and David E. Pozen, Uncivil Obedience, 115 Colum L
Rev 809, 842–43 (2015) (discussing leading definitions of rules and standards in the legal
literature).
215 Schauer, 2003 NZ L Rev at 315 (cited in note 213).
216 Id.
217 Id at 316 (citation omitted).
218 Id at 317.
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While the subjects of Schauer’s account are official legal decisionmakers, its behavioral assumptions would seem to apply, at
least in part, to the reasoning in which legal scholars engage
when they elaborate prescriptive theories. Presented with a certain set of rules or standards that a theory appears to endorse
(“Judges should aspire to promote vague principle X,” “Agencies
must forswear concrete practice Y”), scholars may similarly seek
to recalibrate the degree of discretion that the theory affords by
loosening or tightening its initial formulation. And they may take
these rule-avoiding or rulifying steps for similar reasons: to arrive
at more normatively or empirically satisfying legal frameworks,
to prevent undesirable outcomes in specific cases, to ease their
analytic burden, to signal restraint, and so on. Such adaptive behavior may also help explain how prescriptive legal theories can
experience significant adulteration without departing from their
original formalisms. A theory’s core set of rules or standards may
remain accepted by all those who hold to it, even if different blocs
of theorists would construe those rules or standards in significantly more or less constraining ways.219
The second point of contact between theories of rules/standards
convergence and our theory is that some extreme versions of the
former could be read to anticipate or even subsume the latter.
From Schlag’s point of view, for instance, the life cycle model may
simply describe one instance of the “omnipresent” and “irreducible” dialectic between rules and standards that haunts legal discourse.220 Schlag contends that virtually all legal argumentation
embodies this dialectic and thus follows a predictable path toward
“refinement or entropy”—but never resolution.221 We are skeptical
about the sweep of Schlag’s claim.222 But if he were right, then it

219 More speculatively, in a legal culture in which officials who apply legal rules in
standard-like ways (and standards in rule-like ways) never seem to acknowledge that they
are effectively transforming the initial directive, scholars who seek to move legal theories
up or down the rules/standards spectrum may find it natural to see their interventions as
fleshing out—rather than breaking faith with—the initial theory.
220 Schlag, 33 UCLA L Rev at 426, 430 (cited in note 213).
221 Id at 429.
222 For critical responses, see Louis Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557, 560 n 5 (1992) (suggesting that Schlag’s reductive conclusions
are driven by his “refusal to consider routine applications of the law”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems with Rules, 83 Cal L Rev 953, 965 (1995) (defending the conventional view that
“[t]he contrast between rules and standards is quite useful,” notwithstanding the potential
for slippage between the two concepts).
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may seem rather unsurprising to find certain legal theories becoming impurified; what demands explanation is the way in
which this dynamic appears to unfold so much more slowly and
subtly, if at all, for other sorts of theories. In general, though, the
jurisprudential literature’s various accounts of rules/standards
convergence complement our account insofar as each suggests a
basic instability in efforts to channel legal decisionmaking into a
relatively pure framework, as well as a concomitant need to analyze such efforts in dynamic terms. Whether embedded in an authoritative directive or an academic theory, the initial manner in
which a legal prescription is formulated matters less than is commonly supposed.223
2. Cycles of constitutional theory.
Beyond these abstract theories about the development of
rules and standards, we also find analogues (or, at least, adjuncts)
to our life cycle model in scholarship that identifies a tendency for
constitutional theory, writ large, to experience politically driven
cycles. The most sustained argument to this effect appears in Professor Barry Friedman’s article The Cycles of Constitutional
Theory.224 At any given time, according to Friedman, those constitutional scholars who share the Supreme Court’s political orientation will tend to formulate theories that legitimate broad judicial review, while those scholars who disapprove of the Court’s
223 Schlag’s analysis also helps to clarify why the life cycle that we describe does not
necessarily entail a devolution of rules into standards. As Schlag explains, rules can be
redescribed as standards and vice versa depending on the context, Schlag, 33 UCLA L Rev
at 407–18 (cited in note 213), so nothing critical hangs on the apparent rule-ness of a particular theory’s decision procedure in the abstract. Nevertheless, opponents of the decision
procedure may well fault it for being too rule-like or standard-like—legal critiques perpetually take this form—and thereby drive its life cycle forward.
224 See generally Barry Friedman, The Cycles of Constitutional Theory, 67 L & Contemp Probs 149 (Summer 2004). See also, for example, Whittington, 2 Georgetown J L &
Pub Pol at 604 n 27 (cited in note 38) (“Constitutional theory regarding judicial activism
and restraint, and relative authority of the various branches of government, is linked to
long partisan cycles of reconstruction and affiliation with dominant constitutional norms
and institutions.”). Another partial analogue to our life cycle theory is Professor Balkin’s
theory of “ideological drift,” which maintains that “legal ideas and symbols will change
their political valence as they are used over and over again in new contexts.” J.M. Balkin,
Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 Conn L Rev 869, 871 (1993). While the
life cycles that we describe also involve changes in political valence over time, we focus on
a more specific social phenomenon—and one that is more likely to end in an ideological
muddle (with, for example, liberals and conservatives both claiming originalism simultaneously) than in the sort of ideological inversion that Balkin highlights (with originalism
passing from the right to the left).
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political orientation will tend to promote theories that do the opposite. As a result, a generation of “conservative” or “progressive”
constitutional scholars may, over the course of their careers, shift
from supporting restrictive to supporting expansive theories of judicial power (or vice versa).225 Likewise, multiple generations of
constitutional scholars with the same political orientation may
adopt contradictory theories of judicial review.226
Friedman’s account operates on a longer timescale than ours;
he is concerned with the oscillations across different theories rather than with the evolution of any given theory. Moreover, what
cycles back and forth in Friedman’s narrative is a political bloc’s
general attitude toward judicial review: pro or con. The actual
content of the operative theories does not necessarily follow
suit.227 Whereas we seek to explain the trajectories of individual
legal theories, Friedman seeks to specify the motives that drive
theory choice.
Friedman’s account is nonetheless relevant for our purposes,
both because it illustrates the degree to which public law theories
are bound up with politics and because it helps place the life cycle
in epicyclical context. We noted above that some highly adulterated theories that fall into senescence at T6 may reemerge at a
later date.228 Friedman contends that political blocs will find
themselves in need of a new legal theory at predictable junctures,
when their attitudes toward judicial review change in response to
the changing composition of the Court. The churn of the life cycle
ensures a reserve of institutionally oriented, ideologically ambiguous theories from which such blocs can draw. Indeed, the sorts
of legal theories most likely to undergo the life cycle are just the
sorts of theories that Friedman suggests the politics of judicial
review favor: theories that purport to transcend politics through
“wide-reaching,” “structural” solutions.229
If our life cycle model harmonizes with Friedman’s story in
this way, it also gives reason to suspect that he overstates the
“dilemma” of constitutional theory.230 The many constitutional
225

Friedman, 67 L & Contemp Probs at 157–64 (cited in note 224).
Id at 161–64.
227 As Friedman notes, the legal basis of conservative support for judicial activism in
the early twentieth century was theoretically distinct from the basis of progressive support
for judicial activism in the 1960s and afterward. Id at 157–59.
228 See Part II.C.
229 Friedman, 67 L & Contemp Probs at 171–74 (cited in note 224).
230 Id at 164–67.
226
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scholars who traffic in structural solutions, Friedman warns,
must either abandon their earlier theories of judicial review when
the Court turns over or else “betray their own ideological values.”231 Yet as we have shown, the more wide-reaching and proceduralist a prescriptive theory, the more susceptible it will be to
impurification. This dynamic allows for the sort of political responsiveness that Friedman predicts, but without the replacement
of one theory by another that he assumes must accompany such
responsiveness. A progressive scholar, for instance, may continue
to endorse popular constitutionalism even if the Court turns
sharply in a progressive direction, because legitimation by “the
people themselves”—it will be claimed—can take any number of
institutional forms. Similarly, large numbers of conservative
originalists managed to adjust to the increasingly conservative
composition of the Court without abandoning either originalism
or their own ideological values, because legitimation by the constitutional text does not—it came to be claimed—require a commitment to judicial restraint.232 The impurification process contributes to intergenerational repetition and revisionism in
constitutional scholarship, but it reduces the need for any given
group of scholars to cycle between different theories in response
to shifts in institutional politics.
B. Analogues in Politics and Political Science
For more than a century, political scientists and sociologists
have studied the process of “goal displacement”233 by which organizations that depend on mass support—political parties and trade
unions in particular—tend to attenuate or abandon their initial
policy objectives in order to broaden their membership.234 A related phenomenon is the attenuation or abandonment of policy
231

Id at 165.
Friedman’s chief example of theorists whose ideological values have been “betray[ed]” by their intellectual views comes from the years immediately following the New
Deal, when the commitment of left-leaning realists and process theorists to judicial deference put them out of step with an increasingly liberal Court and an increasingly conservative Congress. Id at 165–67. But realism in its original, antilegalist purity is long dead,
and process theory proved to be much more flexible than its early adherents anticipated.
233 Darcy K. Leach, The Iron Law of What Again? Conceptualizing Oligarchy across
Organizational Forms, 23 Sociological Theory 312, 318 (2005).
234 See Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical
Tendencies of Modern Democracy 365–76 (Hearst’s International Library 1915) (Eden Paul
and Cedar Paul, trans). See also Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy 102–
03 (Cambridge 1985) (noting how the “combination of minority status with majority rule”
232
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objectives after political parties have achieved electoral success
and entered government; this phenomenon is generally attributed to the domination of party representatives by relatively
autonomous state bureaucracies and their private-sector clients.235 These processes of political moderation were first noted,
and have remained especially acute, with respect to European social democracies,236 but similar dynamics have been identified in
the American political system.237 The advent of an era of party
polarization in the United States238 has not necessarily blunted

problem faced by class-based electoral parties results in the compromising of certain party
values to broaden bases of support); Leo Panitch, Social Democracy & Industrial Militancy: The Labour Party, the Trade Unions and Incomes Policy, 1945–1974 235 (Cambridge
1976) (diagnosing the British Labour Party’s trade union relationships as an indication of
an “integrative” ideology beyond the party’s representation of the working class).
235 See, for example, Sidney M. Milkis, The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal 5–6 (Oxford 1993) (identifying
an “inherent tension” between party politics and “an energetic executive” in the US system); Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism 220–40 (NLB 2014) (Patrick Camiller,
trans) (discussing the typical transformations of “parties of power” and noting how the
“loosening of the ties of representation . . . accompanies changes in the institutional position of the parties of power”) (emphases omitted); Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology 224–35 (Oxford 1946) (H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans and eds) (describing the influence of bureaucratic structures on conservative and liberal parties alike).
236 See, for example, Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy 60–73, 99–142 (Verso 2013) (assessing the decline of political parties and popular
involvement in politics across western Europe). See also generally Panitch, Social Democracy & Industrial Militancy (cited in note 234) (analyzing the British Labour Party); Jonas
Pontusson, The Limits of Social Democracy: Investment Politics in Sweden (Cornell 1992)
(considering reform initiatives pursued by the Swedish labor movement in the 1960s
and 1970s).
237 See, for example, Milkis, The President and the Parties at 149–299 (cited in
note 235) (evaluating the New Deal legacy for the American party system); Robert Brenner,
The Paradox of Social Democracy: The American Case, in Mike Davis, Fred Pfeil, and Michael
Sprinker, eds, The Year Left: An American Socialist Yearbook; 1985 32, 33–35 (Verso 1985)
(noting the decline of radical liberal rhetoric since the 1960s in favor of more “realis[tic]”
responses to economic crises).
238 See generally Alan I. Abramowitz, The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens,
Polarization, and American Democracy (Yale 2010); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center
Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 Cal L Rev 273
(2011). Largely in response to this evidence of polarization, American political scientists
have begun to challenge the model of hierarchically organized parties that dilute their
ideological commitments to expand their social bases. See generally, for example, Hans
Noel, Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America (Cambridge 2013); Kathleen
Bawn, et al, A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in
American Politics, 10 Persp on Polit 571 (2012).
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the tendency toward adulteration of policy agendas that accompanies the pursuit of party growth and the penetration of party
representatives into government.239
Processes of party moderation offer an interesting if rather
indirect analogue to the life cycle of prescriptive legal theories. On
the one hand, the goal displacement experienced by political parties that seek to expand their base or enter government can be
seen as the mirror image of the impurification experienced by theories such as originalism or popular constitutionalism. Parties initially hold themselves out as politically radical, but their policy
objectives are gradually adulterated by the moderating forces of
a mass electorate and an autonomous state bureaucracy. Prescriptive legal theories initially hold themselves out as above the
political fray, but their proceduralist prescriptions are gradually
adulterated as they accommodate a range of theoretical criticisms
from participants in or around the political fray. Whereas adulteration in the first case proceeds through depoliticization, adulteration in the second case proceeds through politicization. On the
other hand, processes of party-ideology and legal-theory adulteration can be seen as functionally identical. Both parties and theories adulterate their initial agendas in order to secure the support
of broader constituencies (of voters or scholars) and particularly
powerful groups of experts (entrenched bureaucrats and privatesector interests in the case of parties, official decisionmakers in
the case of theories).
From either point of view, the comparison of political parties
and legal theories highlights the fundamentally sociological orientation of our life cycle account. This account does not reduce
legal theories to the communities of scholars who espouse them,
but neither does it treat them as formal sets of propositions divorced from their shifting social bases. Prescriptive legal theories,
much like political parties, are continually constituting and being
reconstituted by the goals of their supporters.

239

See, for example, Vanessa Williamson, Theda Skocpol, and John Coggin, The Tea
Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, 9 Persp on Polit 25, 36 (2011) (noting
the potential limits of Tea Party–driven Republican electoral success due to the “limited
appeal to the broader American public” of the Tea Party’s conservative ideology, as well
as the disaffection of Tea Party members with the failure of their “insurgent candidates”
to achieve stated policy goals once in office).
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C. Analogues in the History and Philosophy of Science
The life cycle model also bears an interesting resemblance to
some of the literature on theory change in the history and philosophy of science. We have in mind especially Kuhn’s classic account of theory change in the natural sciences,240 although the aspect of his account that is most analogous to our model is shared
by many other accounts of scientific theory change. 241 This aspect
is the claim that experimental falsifications of a given theory do
not necessarily lead to the rejection of that theory so much as to
the complication of its initial formulation.242 According to Kuhn,
scientific “discovery” is nothing other than the adjustment of a
preexisting theory to account for an “anomaly,” or “the recognition
that nature has somehow violated the [ ] expectations” of the
theory.243 Confronted with such violations, scientists do not discard their theory but rather “devise numerous articulations and
ad hoc modifications of their theory”244 until “the anomalous has
become the expected.”245
This process of scientific discovery through theoretical adjustment can, in the long run, lead to the abandonment of one
theory and the adoption of an alternative: that is, a scientific revolution. But first, the incumbent theory must enter a period of
“crisis.” During the critical phase of a theory’s life, anomalies—
and the theoretical adjustments they require—mount at such a rate
and to such an extent that the “complexity” of the theory “increas[es]

240 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago 2d ed 1970). See
also generally Thomas S. Kuhn, The Road since Structure, in Thomas S. Kuhn, The Road
since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970–1993, with an Autobiographical Interview 90
(Chicago 2000) (James Conant and John Haugeland, eds).
241 See generally, for example, Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological
Theory (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1974); Collins, Changing Order (cited in note 4); Paul
Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchist Theory of Knowledge (NLB 1975);
Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, in
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 91
(Cambridge 1970).
242 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 52–53, 77–78, 146–47 (cited in
note 240). This claim most directly challenged Professor Karl Popper’s identification of
“falsifiability” as the necessary condition of a properly “scientific” theory. See Karl R. Popper,
The Logic of Scientific Discovery 17–20 (Basic Books 1959).
243 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 52–53 (cited in note 240).
244 Id at 78.
245 Id at 53.

2016]

Working Themselves Impure

1877

far more rapidly than its accuracy[,] and [ ] a discrepancy corrected in one place [is] likely to show up in another.”246 For example, in the decades before Antoine Lavoisier’s oxygen theory of
combustion displaced the earlier phlogiston theory,247 “the net result of [combustion] experiments” had been a chemical typology
“so elaborate that the phlogiston theory proved increasingly little
able to cope with laboratory experience.”248 While none of the leading chemists of the day “suggested that the [phlogiston] theory
should be replaced, they were unable to apply it consistently.”249
As a result, by the time Lavoisier came along, “there were almost
as many versions of the phlogiston theory as there were pneumatic chemists” conducting combustion experiments.250
Kuhn notes that this “proliferation of versions of a theory is
a very usual symptom of crisis.”251 Another symptom is the increasing resemblance between the theory in crisis and earlier theories that were thought to have been superseded.252 Such critical
symptoms are not, however, sufficient to lead scientists to abandon the incumbent theory. “[A] scientific theory is declared invalid
only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place. . . .
The decision to reject one [theory] is always simultaneously the
decision to accept another.”253
Our life cycle account of legal theories parallels Kuhn’s account of natural scientific theory change in significant ways, but
sharply diverges from it in at least one crucial respect.254 The most
striking parallel is the idea that a theory develops through impurification—through the introduction of unexpected provisos
and the modification, or even abandonment, of formerly central
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Id at 68.
Before oxygen was discovered, phlogiston theory held that a chemical called
“phlogiston” was released when something was burned. See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 66–72 (cited in note 240).
248 Id at 70.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 71 (cited in note 240). See also id
at 74.
252 Id at 72.
253 Id at 77.
254 Kuhn himself discussed the limited applicability of his account to the social or
human sciences. In his view, the key difference between the natural and social sciences is
that, in the former, there is a “relative scarcity of competing schools” at any given time. Id
at 208–09. Whereas a mature natural science tends to be dominated by one “theory,” “paradigm,” or “disciplinary matrix,” a mature social science can flourish without a single governing paradigm. Id at 182–87.
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tenets. This process might tend to be faster or more contentious
in law than in natural science on account of factors such as the
volume of legal scholarship, the adversarial nature of legal discourse, and the political stakes of public law. But the basic structure of theory change is similar. Furthermore, on both accounts,
the process of impurification is occasioned by resistance to the theory
as it exists at a given moment in time. In Kuhn’s narrative, resistance comes from “nature” in the form of physical phenomena
at odds with the theory’s expectations.255 In the life cycle, resistance
comes from society in the form of legal, political, and moral objections leveled at the theory by other theorists and practitioners.
Although there is a logical symmetry between these two
kinds of resistance, their ontologically distinct character leads to
a sharp divergence between Kuhn’s depiction of theory change
and our own. For Kuhn, the boundary between periods of “normal
science” and periods of “crisis”256 is not only sharply drawn but
also normatively significant; the validity of natural science depends on it. During periods of “normal science,” the theoretical
adjustments occasioned by “anomalous” physical phenomena produce scientific “discoveries” and are thus all to the good.257 During
periods of “crisis,” however, a proliferation of anomalies leads to
“pronounced professional insecurity” and an experience of “persistent failure” among scientists, as their theory becomes experimentally unwieldy and internally inconsistent.258 Although it will
not be discarded until a superior alternative emerges, such a
“monster”259 theory is felt to be fundamentally if indescribably at
odds with nature and thus an embarrassment to the profession.
The life cycle of legal theories can admit no such sharp distinction between periods of normal science and crisis, between intrinsically legitimating and delegitimating theoretical modifications. To be sure, the process of impurification may produce legal
theories that increasingly fail to influence crucial decisionmakers
or that are criticized for incoherence or bad faith.260 But there is
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Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 52–53 (cited in note 240).
Id at 74–75.
257 Id at 62–65.
258 Id at 67–68.
259 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 69 (cited in note 240).
260 See David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 Harv L Rev 885, 918–39 (2016)
(discussing the role of accusations of bad faith in constitutional debates generally); id at
946 n 304 (discussing accusations of bad faith directed at liberal originalist scholarship
specifically).
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2016]

Working Themselves Impure

1879

no truly external standard against which a theoretical modification can be deemed to have come up short. There are only other
scholars and practitioners who may accept or reject the theory in
its currently adulterated form. Normal science in the legal community—as perhaps in all social scientific and humanistic endeavors—is always in a critical phase.261
There are historians and philosophers of science who argue
that this reflexivity characterizes the natural sciences as well—
that we lack the epistemological resources to draw any fundamental distinction between the natural and social sciences on the basis of the existence of a nonhuman nature.262 Kuhn is not one of
them, though. He denies the falsifiability of natural scientific theories for the reason that no “anomalous” natural phenomenon will
invalidate a scientific theory in the absence of a superior, alternative theory offered by human hands.263 But he also rejects thoroughgoing social constructivism.264 Nature is out there, Kuhn insists, a source of phenomena that can be described in a variety of
different ways but that cannot be persuaded out of existence.265 It
is nature, in the last instance, that dictates a theory’s descent
from normal science into crisis and therefore, potentially, supersession through revolution.
In the absence of such a dictatorial nature, the only force that
can cause a highly adulterated legal theory to “go bad”—and be

261

See Winch, The Idea of a Social Science at 88 (cited in note 4):

If we are going to compare the social student to an engineer, we shall do better
to compare him to an apprentice engineer who is studying what engineering . . .
is all about. His understanding of social phenomena is more like the engineer’s
understanding of his colleagues’ activities than it is like the engineer’s understanding of the mechanical systems which he studies.
262 See generally, for example, Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory
(cited in note 241); Collins, Changing Order (cited in note 4).
263 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions at 77, 146–47 (cited in note 240).
264 See, for example, Kuhn, The Road since Structure at 91 (cited in note 240) (criticizing “the excesses of postmodernist movements like the strong program [in the sociology
of scientific knowledge]”). Calvin TerBeek reaches a different conclusion in his recent application of Kuhnian theory to constitutional theory, analogizing the current state of
originalism to the critical phase of a natural scientific paradigm. See Calvin TerBeek,
Originalism’s Obituary, 2015 Utah L Rev OnLaw 29, 33, 40.
265 See, for example, Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in Lakatos and Musgrave,
eds, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 231, 263 (cited in note 241) (“[N]ature cannot
be forced into an arbitrary set of conceptual boxes. . . . [T]he history of developed science
shows that nature will not indefinitely be confined in any set which scientists have constructed so far.”).
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seen to require discarding—is the negative judgment of other legal theorists and practitioners. The next Part considers in further
detail some of the reasons theorists and practitioners may have
for making, or declining to make, such a negative judgment.
V. LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS
What does it say about a legal culture that its leading prescriptive theories tend to work themselves impure in the ways we
have described? If the life cycle model captures something true
about the development of legal movements, then this question
warrants sustained investigation and reflection. We focus on two
implications here. At a macro level, we suggest, the life cycle plays
a generally salutary role in moderating the pace of legal change
and maintaining a productive tension between law and politics.
At a micro level, the life cycle underscores the need to look beyond
the four corners of any given legal theory to understand the work
it is doing. As the examples of originalism and CBA demonstrate
in particular, adulterated theories may exert powerful disciplinary
effects on legal scholarship and practice even after they have
abandoned many of their initial assumptions and prescriptions,
and even after they have failed to achieve their initial normative
goals.
A. The Conservatism of Legal Theory
When public law theorists propose to resolve a politically
fraught legal conflict by advancing a new decision procedure or
decisionmaking ideal, the stakes can seem quite high. The relationship between legal theory and legal practice is uncertain and
complex, of course, and theorists may be inclined to overstate
their influence. Nonetheless, as the case studies in Part III reflect, the sociological connections between the legal academy, the
courts, and the administrative state are close enough to enable a
prescriptive theory of public law, under the right conditions, to
move quickly from the law reviews and lecture halls to the United
States Reports and the Federal Register. Yet as our case studies
also reflect, the ultimate impact of such a theory’s adoption is unlikely to prove as normatively significant as one might assume at
the outset. Prescriptive legal theories tend to succeed only after
running the gauntlet of the life cycle; by the time they achieve
widespread acceptance, their leading formulations look very
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different from their initial formulations. The theories come to recapitulate rather than resolve the underlying conflict in which
they intervened.
It follows that the early proponents and opponents of these
theories may not be playing for stakes that are as high as they
think. The former can hope to achieve only partial victory. As time
goes by, theories such as originalism, textualism, popular constitutionalism, and CBA end up not so much displacing as encompassing rival approaches such as living constitutionalism, purposivism, departmentalism, and qualitative analysis. If
proponents of prescriptive legal theories find this observation to
be chastening, opponents might find it a source of comfort—and
power. Critics of ascendant theoretical movements, we have seen,
may be able to “win through losing”266 by prompting concessions
and tempering the perceived excesses of a disfavored theory.
While an appreciation of the life cycle may counsel a certain realism about legal reform, it does not justify fatalism or quiescence.
The life cycle model also helps to illustrate why it is a fallacy
of composition267 to assume that if certain leading theorists or theories seem “radical” at any given time,268 legal theory as a collective
enterprise will be radical as well. The dialectic of impurification
tends, instead, to push legal movements in more inclusive and
conciliatory directions. To focus solely on a specific group of legal
theory entrepreneurs or their specific proposals is to miss the
myriad external forces that will inevitably rework their ideas,
compromise their objectives, and condition their influence. A dynamic perspective is needed to understand the aggregate effects
of such theorizing.

266 For a thoughtful analysis of “winning through losing” scenarios in public law litigation, see generally Douglas NeJaime, Winning through Losing, 96 Iowa L Rev 941 (2011).
267 See Adrian Vermeule, The Supreme Court 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects
and the Constitution, 123 Harv L Rev 4, 44–72 (2009) (discussing the fallacies of composition and division commonly made by public law scholars).
268 See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme Right-Wing
Courts Are Wrong for America 9–34 (Basic Books 2005) (describing proponents of originalism as “radicals,” “extremists,” and “fundamentalists”); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing
Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 Mich L
Rev 2191, 2199 (1993) (“Many, although not all, of the legal theorists would like to bring
about a radical transformation of society.”); Kathryn M. Stanchi and Jan M. Levine, Gender and Legal Writing: Law Schools’ Dirty Little Secrets, 16 Berkeley Women’s L J 1, 3 n 2
(2001) (“The radicalism of American law professors is so legendary that it has led one
commentator to joke that the only Marxists left in the ‘entire world’ teach in American
universities.”).
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The life cycle theory itself ought to be considered in a dynamic
perspective. We have emphasized that the susceptibility of prescriptive public law theories to impurification is partly a consequence of the form they generally take: process oriented and silent on the values that animate the conflicts they seek to resolve.
As discussed in Part I, an especially bullish market for public law
theories that purport to offer a depoliticized proceduralism has
existed since the 1980s. This market is attributable to a series of
contingent historical events: the failure of New Deal–era legal realism to secure the autonomy and primacy of the legal profession
within the administrative state; the critique of the legal process
school’s assumption of an underlying cultural consensus on the
nature of rationality and democracy; and the backlash against the
strongly normative legal theorizing of the 1960s and 1970s.269 If
mainstream public law theorizing were to become more openly
ideological or outcome oriented, then the life cycle might no longer
loom so large. Perhaps the tendency of prescriptive public law theories to work themselves impure will wane in the years ahead.
Perhaps, but we are doubtful. The norm—and the rhetorical
utility—of claiming political neutrality has a long pedigree in
American public law,270 and we can detect few signs of a nascent
retreat from proceduralism and depoliticization in current scholarship. The life cycle model could lose most of its descriptive and
predictive power one day, but it would take a sea change in our
legal culture.
All of this may seem rather dispiriting insofar as it underscores the limits of legal theory and the obstacles to legal change.
Those who believe that public law decisionmaking needs fundamental reform may be especially exasperated by the life cycle: one
can hear this exasperation in the laments of “old-time” originalists that the theory has “lost its soul,”271 or in the insistence of
269

See Part I.A.
See, for example, John Denvir, William Shakespeare and the Jurisprudence of
Comedy, 39 Stan L Rev 825, 825 (1987) (describing constitutional theory’s “ceaseless
search for a ‘neutral’ method of articulating and applying constitutional norms”). As explained in Parts I and II, prescriptive legal theories of recent vintage have not necessarily
shied away from endorsing the primacy of a particular set of substantive values, such as
wealth maximization or popular sovereignty; they have not reverted to the more fundamental search for “neutrality” associated with traditional legal process. What makes such
theories “abstract” and “proceduralist” is their relative neutrality—their neutrality with
respect to the values constitutive of a given politicized legal conflict.
271 See notes 83–85 and accompanying text (quoting Professor Steven Smith). For examples of similar laments, see Nelson Lund, Living Originalism: The Magical Mystery
270
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economically minded theorists that deontological considerations
simply cannot be a part of CBA.272 Yet while the impurification of
any given theory is likely to strike many as suboptimal, the evolutionary pattern that we describe has some significant benefits
for the legal system as a whole. The crises that felled legal realism
and legal process are conventionally thought to have stemmed
from a failure to manage the inextricable yet antagonistic relationship between law and politics; legal realism was insufficiently
attentive to law, while legal process was insufficiently attentive
to politics. The thoroughgoing politicization of law and the thoroughgoing legalization of politics both left lawyers in a protracted
state of bad faith, either denying their own social and economic
privilege as a distinctive professional class or denying the political conditions that underwrote that privilege. The contemporary
mode of prescriptive legal theorizing, in contrast, allows lawyers
to be lawyers even as it ceaselessly exposes them to the vicissitudes of politics. By proposing abstract theories about how legal
decisions should be reached, lawyers exercise their core competencies. By having to adulterate these theories in response to politically charged critiques, lawyers are forced to acknowledge the
empirical and normative limits of their capacity to solve public
problems.
More importantly, through the life cycles (and epicycles) that
legal theories undergo, law regenerates itself. Even if the controversies in which they intervene are ultimately irresolvable by
law, legal theories’ tendency to supply process-oriented solutions
that then undergo impurification keeps law “in the game.” Law is
neither so powerful that it stifles major value conflicts, nor so inflexible that political actors demand an abandonment of it altogether. The dynamism of individual public law theories thus supports an overarching conservatism and stability in public law
practice—not because the law itself is purified in a Burkean fashion through durable traditions that generate better and better

Tour, 3 Tex A&M L Rev 31, 43 (2015) (“[T]o marry originalism and living constitutionalism
. . . leaves originalism itself in a condition akin to the legal death married women experienced under the old rules of coverture. Quite a victory.”); Joel Alicea, Originalism and the
Rule of the Dead, 23 Natl Aff 149, 161 (2015) (arguing that originalism’s legacy “is now
imperiled by the rise of novel originalist theories”).
272 See notes 198–203 and accompanying text.
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judgments,273 but rather because legal innovation is perpetually
tempered by political and professional feedback, and political contest is perpetually rerouted through law.
While public law may not work itself pure, then, the impurification of influential prescriptive theories both reflects and reinforces its responsiveness to public deliberation and debate. This
interpretation of the life cycle as part of a salutary, dialogic process of legal development echoes familiar accounts of the (passably) democratic character of Anglo-American common law.274 The
irony of contemporary prescriptive theories is that, in trying to
cabin legal discretion through formalistic, high-level frameworks,
these theories end up catalyzing the sort of incremental contestation and transformation celebrated by defenders of discretionary,
common-law decisionmaking.
B. The Double Life of Successful Legal Theories
In light of the life cycle, the persistence of the best-known
prescriptive legal theories presents something of a puzzle. These
theories manage to secure a broad following only after abandoning, or at least substantially modifying, the normative commitments and practical proposals that recommended the theories in
the first place. At their inception, originalism, textualism, and
CBA promised to simplify and constrain judicial, executive, and
scholarly resolution of public law debates, while partly insulating
decisionmakers from the war of first-order values that undergirded those debates. Today, these theories’ decision procedures
balloon with exceptions, metaprocedures, and side constraints.
Not only do such baroque frameworks fail to simplify or constrain
the work of decision; they actually dramatize the value-laden conflicts that the early proponents of these theories had promised to

273 See Michael S. Moore, The Dead Hand of Constitutional Tradition, 19 Harv J L &
Pub Pol 263, 269 (1996) (drawing a connection between Edmund Burke’s faith in incrementalism and in the wisdom of tradition and Lord Mansfield’s idea that the common law
works itself pure).
274 See, for example, Gerald J. Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part
II), 3 Oxford U Commonwealth L J 1, 7–11 (2003) (discussing the classical understanding
of common-law reasoning as deliberative, public, and shared); Matthew Steilen, The Democratic Common Law, 10 J Juris 437, 438 (2011) (arguing that “common-law adjudication
mimics the deliberative process that gives enacted law its legitimacy”).
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defuse.275 Such conflicts now take place within the highly adulterated procedural field of our most influential public law theories.
The puzzle is why certain theories that fail to achieve their initial
goals nonetheless gain and sustain such broad support, and what
work this strange form of success accomplishes.
1. An exogenous hypothesis for theory persistence.
These questions suggest the outlines of a program of empirical research, one that we commend but cannot undertake here.
We propose, however, that such a program begin with the following hypothesis: highly adulterated legal theories persist to a large
degree because of the work they do “off the page”—serving interests and ideals that are exogenous to the theories’ stated norms.
However elegant or powerful it might be, the internal logic of a
theory like originalism or CBA is unable to provide a satisfying
basis for explaining the theory’s persistence, given how compromised and contested that logic eventually becomes. It seems to us
more likely that prescriptive legal theories have second-order
(and third- and fourth-order) effects on the world that cannot necessarily be gleaned from their academic expositions, and that
these effects are in fact what determine their fate at the end of
the life cycle.
What might this look like in practice? CBA, some have suggested, tends to enhance the power and prestige of economists and
their allies within the legal academy and the administrative
state.276 Even when seemingly noneconomic values such as dignity are incorporated within the cost-benefit calculus, the very
form of the calculus exerts a disciplinary effect, privileging a certain mode of expertise and a certain vision of the administrative
state that marginalizes alternative visions. Similarly, originalism
and textualism may tend to enhance the power and prestige of

275 For its part, popular constitutionalism initially promised not just to constrain but
to marginalize judicial resolution of constitutional debates, and yet it is now invoked by
some to justify vigorous judicial review of unpopular or “jurispathic” federal legislation.
See Part III.C.
276 See, for example, Elizabeth Magill and Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power within
Agencies, 120 Yale L J 1032, 1051 (2011) (“[CBA] expands the range within which economists, scientists, and other nonlegal professionals effectively choose agency policy.”). See
also id at 1080 (“Once lawyers, scientists, or economists—or any other professionals—are
employed to cope with a particular issue, they become major stakeholders within agencies,
and their influence can seep out laterally to encompass issues other than the one for which
they were originally conscripted.”).

1886

The University of Chicago Law Review

[83:1819

lawyers as a privileged expert class, while raising barriers to entry for nonlegal actors. Originalism may also serve the interests
of American elites more generally, at home and abroad, insofar as
it implies that American power is constrained by an age-old set of
universally appealing principles of good governance.277
Even the diversity and discord that frequently characterize
highly adulterated legal theories may produce exogenous effects
that favor their persistence. Take, for example, the potentially
productive tension between byzantine academic defenses of a
late-stage theory and the existence in popular discourse of a simpler, idealized version of that theory. Several scholars have posited just such a double life in the case of originalism.278 On this
account, the professional embrace of a theory, in an impure form,
lends intellectual legitimacy to its popular variant.279 In turn, the
political appeal of the popular variant stimulates demand for the
continuing professional use of the theory, however great the discrepancy between the popular and professional versions may be.280
In a related vein, there may be situations in which two mutually reinforcing versions of a theory, one much “purer” than the
other, exist within the professional legal community. We noted in
Part III, for example, that while CBA has become endlessly complicated and compromised in law journals and in high-profile legal
documents such as Executive Order 13563, federal administrators
may continue to deploy a relatively pure, efficiency-maximizing
277 See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 Georgetown L J 657, 708, 714 (2009)
(arguing that originalism’s success “in the methodologies market” is attributable in part
to the theory’s “emphatic, irreducible ‘American-ness’”); Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and
the Foundations of the Security State, 103 Cal L Rev 335, 352–81 (2015) (attributing the
rise of “constitutionalism” in twentieth-century America to the efforts of internationalist
lawyers and politicians to distinguish their expansionist projects from imperialism).
278 See, for example, Greene, 72 Ohio St L J at 1192–93 (cited in note 50); Michael
Dorf, Canonical Case Skepticism and the Cartoon Version of Nonoriginalism (Dorf on Law,
Oct 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4RK5-T6SC.
279 To the extent that prescriptive public law theorizing is trending toward the style
of scholarly erudition that Professor Schlag has labeled “knowledge production,” the effects of intellectual legitimation may become all the greater as the distance between the
academic and popular variants of a theory expand. See Pierre Schlag, The Knowledge Bubble—a Diagnostic for Expertopia *2–4 (Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper No 1519, Mar 4, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/CKY6-VBHW.
280 This dialectic may at times lead to the reintroduction of the normatively purer,
popular variant into professional usage. For example, Professor Michael Dorf has suggested that the “more intellectually defensible versions of originalism,” which lack clear
ideological content, “give[ ] cover to the conservative judges and politicians who invoke
‘originalism’ generically”—that is, in the vulgate. Dorf, Canonical Case Skepticism (cited
in note 278).
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variant of CBA in practice.281 In this case, the presence of the
adulterated form of CBA—which ostensibly incorporates dignity,
fairness, and other such “soft” variables into the analysis—may
help to legitimate and shield from scrutiny the continuing, controversial primacy of efficiency maximization within certain
agencies.
2. Alternative hypotheses.
Other hypotheses deserve consideration. It is tempting to explain the persistence of highly adulterated legal theories in a
much more deflationary manner, as a story of path dependence
and transaction costs: once a theory wins sufficient popularity, its
opponents feel compelled to engage with the theory on its own
terms, which means learning the language. And once the relevant
scholars and officials have learned the language, it is simply easier for everyone to go on speaking it, rearticulating their fundamental disagreements through its prism.282 This deflationary account of theory persistence, however, is insufficient for at least
two reasons.
First, it has few resources to explain why some highly adulterated legal theories flourish whereas others recede into obscurity. For instance, despite similar initial commitments to judicial
restraint and popular sovereignty, and an equally if not more simplistic decisional formalism, popular constitutionalism seems to
be waning at this time while originalism reigns supreme.283 The
best the deflationary account can do is demonstrate that originalism arrived on the scene first, and that a transition to popular
constitutionalism therefore would have required new learning.
Yet this explanation depends on the assumption that only one legal theory is dominant, or widely spoken, at a given time. While
that assumption might well be warranted in the natural sciences,

281

See notes 204–12 and accompanying text.
Such a dynamic likely reinforces theory persistence to some extent in all disciplines, but one would expect it to have the most bite in those disciplines in which the costs
of theory change are so high that the theorists themselves cannot possibly afford them.
See, for example, Collins, Changing Order at 160 (cited in note 4) (noting with regard to
the physical sciences that “[i]n times of financial stringency the risky, extraordinary phase
of science is likely to suffer disproportionately,” leading to a halt in “[t]he progress and
development of scientific expertise”).
283 See note 57 and accompanying text.
282
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it is much less plausible in the social sciences.284 Our suggested
hypothesis, on the other hand, can explain the waning of popular
constitutionalism in terms of the poor fit between its decision procedure—which even in its adulterated formulations continues to
exalt “the people themselves”—and the interests of legal elites.
The second problem with the deflationary account is that a
focus on path dependence and transaction costs ignores the dynamism of widely accepted prescriptive legal theories. As we have
seen, these theories gain acceptance through an iterated process
of adaptation and adulteration, which demands a constant openness to challenge and capacity for change. Yet the deflationary
account explains the persistence of such theories on the ground
that theoretical learning is prohibitively expensive. While it could
be the case that learning is cheap until a theory succeeds and only
then becomes prohibitively expensive, the successful theories we
have surveyed do not demonstrate any sharp break between a period of experimentation and a period of entrenchment. Prescriptive legal theories continue to adulterate or they fade away.
While the deflationary account of theory persistence has little
to recommend it, another alternative account deserves more serious consideration, and serves as a useful check on our hypothesis
that exogenous factors are likely to explain which adulterated
theories persist and which do not. This internalist account hypothesizes that (i) there exists in any persistent, highly adulterated theory a “hard core”—a durable set of propositions and practices—that remains relatively unaffected by impurification; and
(ii) it is the practical utility or normative validity of this hard core
that motivates the theory’s popularity and longevity. In other
words, the internalist account suggests that when highly adulterated theories persist, they do so because they really have succeeded on their own initial terms, pared down to those terms’
most essential elements.285
284 See note 254 (discussing Professor Kuhn’s view that the natural sciences, in contrast to the social sciences, tend to be dominated by one theoretical school at any particular
moment in time).
285 This explanation of legal theory persistence in terms of a successful “hard core”
mirrors the philosopher of science Imre Lakatos’s response to Kuhn’s account of theory
change in the natural sciences. Lakatos accepted the contention that scientists will generally make ad hoc adjustments to their theory in the face of experimental falsification rather than abandon the theory altogether. But, he argued, there are always some theoretical propositions—a theory’s hard core—that are so essential to the theory that they cannot
be abandoned; experimental falsification of these propositions, accordingly, would necessarily result in abandonment of the theory itself. Theories persist so long as their hard
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The plausibility of such an internalist explanation gains support from certain features of the life cycle model itself. As discussed in Part I.C, however adulterated a given theory may become, its increasingly diverse proponents generally remain
committed to the theory’s initial decisional formalism. (Originalists do not abandon the decisional centrality of the constitutional
text; cost-benefit analysts do not abandon the decisional centrality of a calculus of trade-offs; and so forth.) It is because of this
persistence of a theory’s initial decisional formalism that we are
able to identify the theory as persisting at all, as opposed to becoming some other theory or disappearing altogether.
Accordingly, internalists can argue, it is wrong to say that a
theory has abandoned its initial normative commitments at T6, as
the theory remains committed to the norms intrinsic to its formalism. If this is the case, then the theory’s persistence may be explained by broad acceptance of those norms, which in turn may be
explained by their validity or utility in guiding legal decisionmaking.
In the case of textualism, for instance, the resilient hard core
might include a prescription such as “pay careful attention to
statutory text when interpreting a statute.” Textualists today
may no longer share most of the normative commitments that the
legal community associated with textualism in the 1980s. But the
commitment to paying careful attention to statutory text remains. And the felicity of that commitment could explain why
more and more people have become textualists over time.
Such an internalist explanation is intuitively appealing. We
are happy to concede both the existence of such a minimal hard
core and the likelihood that it plays some causal role in the persistence of otherwise-adulterated prescriptive legal theories.
Nonetheless, we do not think this hypothesis offers an actual alternative to our own hypothesis. For one thing, we are skeptical
about the extent to which minimal prescriptions such as “pay
careful attention to statutory text when interpreting a statute”
have normative or practical significance for legal decisionmaking.
On the margins, such a prescription, if internalized by officials,
could certainly affect their approach to legal questions. But it is
hard to see how such an indeterminate norm could do more substantial work in guiding legal decision. One does not need to be a
thoroughgoing skeptic about the concepts of legal “validity” and
core is not falsified. See generally Lakatos, Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific
Research Programmes (cited in note 241).
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“utility” to wonder whether the appeal of such a maxim has less
to do with its normative or practical payoffs than with its rhetorical
power—its resonance with social expectations and self-conceptions
about the lawyer’s or judge’s role. To push the point further, explanation of an adulterated theory’s persistence in terms of the
appeal of its hard core of minimal prescriptions may just be explanation of that theory’s persistence in terms of exogenous factors: the second-order benefits that accrue to those legal theorists
and practitioners who commit to norms that are socially or professionally celebrated but legally indeterminate.
Moreover, even if one were to accept that an adulterated
theory’s unchanging, minimal prescriptions enjoy widespread
support because of the work they do in guiding legal decision, the
internalist explanation of theory persistence would still face another challenge. This challenge arises from the contrast between
the overall complexity of an adulterated theory at T6 and the simplicity and generality of its hard core. Given this contrast, the internalist needs to explain why legal actors attracted to such a
theory’s minimal prescriptions would choose to take on board the
theory as a whole. There is no need to adopt the theory of textualism to “pay careful attention to statutory text when interpreting
a statute” or to believe that this prescription should be heeded
throughout the legal community. This prescription predates the
rise of modern textualist theory, and it is embraced by many
scholars and judges who are not identified with that theory. “Pay
careful attention to statutory text when interpreting a statute”
may well be a normatively and practically appealing maxim, but
this appeal does not itself explain why scholars and practitioners would affiliate themselves with the complex and even selfcontradictory theory that textualism has become.
In responding to this challenge, we suspect the internalist
would have to draw on some version of the deflationary hypothesis sketched above. It could be argued, for instance, that while
textualism’s minimal prescriptions may seem generic, they
gained new prominence within the legal community thanks to the
emergence of textualist theory, and as a result it would be more
time-consuming or otherwise costly at this point to disavow the
theory while maintaining its minimal prescriptions. In addition
to the weaknesses of the deflationary hypothesis already identified, the problem with this argument from path dependency is
that, given the complexity of a highly adulterated legal theory, it
is difficult to imagine that it would be more costly to disavow the
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theory while maintaining its minimal prescriptions than to maintain both. However normatively or practically appealing such a
theory’s hard core, it thus seems unlikely to be able to explain the
persistence of the theory as a whole.
3. New directions for public law research (and resistance).
To summarize: in light of the weaknesses of alternative explanations, the exogenous hypothesis—that highly adulterated
legal theories persist because they serve interests and ideals that
are not compassed by the theories themselves—strikes us as the
most useful starting point for further empirical work.
If this hypothesis proves correct, it would warrant an important caveat to Part V.A’s relatively optimistic take on the life
cycle. To whatever extent highly adulterated theories persist because they serve interests and ideals “off the page,” such persistence will not merely recapitulate the legal and political status
quo. Instead, it will subtly shift the balance of social and economic
forces within the status quo. At T6 of the life cycle, some legal actors will be in a more powerful position than they were at T1, and
so will be better equipped to resolve the underlying dispute on
favorable terms. Recapitulating a debate about the definition and
enforcement of fundamental rights through an originalist lens
could influence the ultimate outcome of the debate insofar as a
bipartisan embrace of originalism enhances the persuasive authority of certain lawyers—for example, those steeped in Foundingera history—or links the question of rights to a certain vision of
American nationalism or exceptionalism. On multiple levels,
then, adulterated theories may exert disciplinary effects on the
legal academy and the practice of law even when they fail to
achieve their internal goals—altering not only which sorts of lawyers (and nonlawyers) are in or out, up or down, but also which
styles of research, rhetoric, and justification have more or less
currency. These effects operate at the level of ideas and institutions, not just individual reputations and aesthetics.
A new research program for public law scholarship might investigate these dynamics within the framework of the life cycle
model. The life cycle suggests that systematic scrutiny of the indirect
and unintended effects of prescriptive legal theories is integral to
understanding why these theories succeed, and to assessing the
costs of that success. At the same time, the life cycle does not sug-
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gest that it is misguided or vainglorious for legal theory entrepreneurs to think they can change the world, as well as their own
professional and public standing, by introducing new “isms” that
gain a wide following. The vision of success that motivates such
entrepreneurs, however, may be surprisingly unrelated—or even
antagonistic—to the kinds of legal and political change that a
widely accepted theory ends up producing.
For similar reasons, our account does not suggest that it is
misguided for critics of prescriptive legal theories to resist them.
Such resistance is what leads to impurification. Moreover, by taking a hard line against the adoption of disfavored theories, in any
form, critics might be able to limit the indirect social and political
transformations that are the most lasting effects of theoretical
victory.
CONCLUSION
In arguing that process-oriented legal theories tend to share
a common life cycle, we do not mean to deny the place of contingency in legal development. We cannot predict what the next big
prescriptive legal theory will be. But the analysis here does give
a basis to predict that, whatever normative dividends this theory
promises to deliver at the outset, it will become more ideologically
amorphous and internally conflicted—and less dissimilar to the
rival theories that preceded it—over the course of the years that
follow.
If this Article’s central argument is correct, it has broad implications both for how we should understand the function of legal
theorizing and for how we should evaluate and engage the legal
theories around us. To the extent that a process-oriented theory
really does pose a significant threat to its opponents, we can now
see that this threat does not stem from the significant normative
values it initially neglects, as those values are apt to be incorporated into the theory. Rather, the deeper threat lies in the indirect—and often unintended—ways in which the theory’s advancement may reshape legal culture. One upshot is a need for more
externalist approaches to legal argument. When the next big public law theory comes along, commentators would do well to focus
not only on the merits of its initial decisionmaking framework but
also on the social, political, and ideological effects that such a
framework’s adulterated descendants could foster, down the line.

